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INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War featured constant covert conflicts, such as terrorism and 
proxy wars ranging “from one end of the globe to the other.”1 These conflicts 
repeatedly threatened to erupt into overt (nuclear) warfare. Russia and NATO 
are on the edge of a new cold war because of the illegal annexation of Crimea2 
and more than a half dozen other issues, such as Syria,3 gay rights,4 Magnitsky 
list,5 et cetera. I call the current situation a cold peace. This cold peace features 
isolated and exceptional regional conflicts as opposed to the systemic global 
conflict that was the Cold War. Furthermore, there is much less state-
sponsored terrorism in the cold peace than occurred in the Cold War. 
Consequently, exceptional regional conflicts such as Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Syria may be manageable but must be understood as occurring in an 
asymmetric field, with zero-sum outcomes regulated more often by politics 
than by law. Although positive-sum outcomes remain possible in economic 
relations, they have become less likely due to Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Ukraine.6 
Consequently, Russia will most likely be increasingly isolated politically 
and economically, and Russian foreign relations will be increasingly zero-sum 
or even negative-sum. However, Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s 
President and Foreign Minister, respectively, are both rational actors and are 
not in fact “[i]n another world.”7 They pursue the Russian national interest 
following a realist theory of international relations.8 United Russia has crafted 
a coherent narrative and implements an alternative ideology that allows it to 
challenge global liberalism—to the detriment of the rule of law and protection 
 
 1. Aaron David Miller, Five Myths About the Ukraine Crisis, CNN (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:00 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/08/opinion/miller-five-myths-about-ukraine-crisis/. 
 2. See Fred Dews, NATO Secretary-General: Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Is Illegal and 
Illegitimate, BROOKINGS (Mar. 19, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-
now/posts/2014/03/nato-secretary-general-russia-annexation-crimea-illegal-illegitimate. 
 3. Holly Yan, Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and China Are Standing by the Regime, CNN 
(Aug. 29, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-
supporters/. 
 4. Russia: Anti-LGBT Law a Tool for Discrimination, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/29/russia-anti-lgbt-law-tool-discrimination. 
 5. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on 12 Russians, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
2014, at A8. 
 6. Dews, supra note 2. 
 7. Contra Peter Baker, Pressure Rising as Obama Works to Rein in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2014, at A1 (quoting Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany). Anne Applebaum 
wondered aloud whether Putin might be irrational: “[U]nless Russian President Vladimir Putin 
suddenly becomes irrational—which, of course, can’t be excluded—he must know that a full-
scale invasion is entirely unnecessary.” Anne Applebaum, Russia Puts on the Squeeze, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2014, at A17. 
 8. RICHARD SAKWA, PUTIN: RUSSIA’S CHOICE 267 (2d ed. 2008). 
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of human rights. Russia presents a real risk to the global rule of law due to 
domestic corruption and international lawlessness, as most recently seen in 
Ukraine in Donetsk and Crimea, but also in Georgia and the various “frozen” 
conflicts in other former Soviet Republics (Moldova, Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia).9 However, that challenge is regional, not global, and cannot become 
global because Russian ideology is involuted and unattractive. Furthermore, 
though rational actors, President Putin and/or Foreign Minister Lavrov 
overestimate Russia’s power and possibilities and underestimate the resiliency 
of NATO Member States. 
To reduce the risks of a new cold war with rampant proxy wars and state-
sponsored terrorism and to effectively foster the rule of law, the protection of 
human rights, and democratic internationalism, NATO Member States must 
recognize the exact nature of the challenge with which they are confronted. A 
proper appreciation of Russia’s real strengths and weaknesses will enable the 
North Atlantic alliance to firmly and appropriately meet the challenge it now 
faces, neither overreacting nor underreacting. Some refer to the Russian 
challenge as “Soviet Union 2.0.”10 However, that overstates and 
misapprehends the challenge. To understand the challenge Russia presents and 
why it is not “Soviet Union 2.0,” we must understand the roots of the challenge 
in the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. 
I.  THE COLD WAR 
To understand the Cold War we must understand Russia and the Soviet 
Union; to understand the Soviet Union we must understand Marxism. Thus, we 
start our inquiry with an examination of Marxism, then the Soviet Union, and 
finally the transformation from cold war to cold peace. This inquiry proceeds 
in historical order. 
A. Marxism 
The Cold War was driven in theory by a pervasive and irreconcilable 
ideological conflict between liberal individualist capitalism versus collectivist 
authoritarian socialism. To understand the Soviet Union and why the Russian 
Federation is not “Soviet Union 2.0,” we must understand Marxist theory. 
Although Marxist ideology drove the USSR, Marxist thinking is remarkably 
absent in the ideology of Putin’s United Russia party. We examine Marxist 
theory first from the economic base, which is the foundation of the ideological 
 
 9. Volodymyr Valkov, Expansionism: The Core of Russia’s Foreign Policy, NEW E. EUR. 
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1292-expansionism-
the-core-of-russia-s-foreign-policy. 
 10. See Charles Clover, Clinton Vows to Thwart New Soviet Union, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6, 
2012) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0.html (“There is a 
move to re-Sovietise the region.” (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton)). 
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superstructure in Marxist thought. After understanding Marxist economics, we 
then look at the Marxist ideological superstructure built on that base11 in order 
to understand the USSR as the precursor and predecessor state to the Russian 
Federation. 
1. Marxist Economic Theory 
According to Marxism, history follows progressive development through 
successive stages in a dialectical spiral12 of class conflict: thesis versus 
antithesis leading to their synthesis at a higher level of systemic order. Marx 
believed the numerous social classes in history had been reduced by economic 
progress to a bi-polar zero-sum conflict between capitalists and workers.13 
Marxism holds that capitalism, with its inevitable economic cyclicity, fosters 
warfare to obtain access to resources, to increase market-share, and to employ 
the unemployed.14 Marx predicted the inevitable collapse of advanced 
capitalist economies in revolution due to ever-greater economic cyclicity: 
economic boom, panic, depression, and war.15 For Marxism, the inevitable 
tendency of capitalism is to monopolize16 because of brutal zero-sum 
competition: each capitalist wishes to destroy his or her competitor, legally if 
possible, illegally if necessary.17 Per Marx, capitalists are driven into 
destructive competition in order to obtain a larger market-share and more 
profits, even without “rent seeking,” though rent seeking also motivates brutal 
and destructive competition.18 Economies of scale, entry costs, and 
specialization are other factors that push capitalism toward monopolizing. 
 
 11. Often, when people analyze Al-Qaeda they note that the name Al-Qaeda means base. 
Most analysts recognize the name as referring to Al-Qaeda as originally a database of 
Mujahadeen and not as a reference to Marxist theory of the productive base and the ideological 
superstructure, or for that matter of Maoist theory of guerilla zones and guerilla base areas. 
 12. See JEAN RIVERO, LES LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES 87–88 (1974) (“In addition, Marxism is 
historical materialism. It believes that man and society are at every moment, a reflection and 
product of history and of the dialectical movement behind it. In this perspective the existence of 
permanent rights, given once and for all, and removed the movement of history, is obviously 
unacceptable. Like all the laws, ‘human rights’ are only a reflection of the economic 
infrastructure. The expression of the power of the ruling class, and the means for it to impose its 
domination the exploited classes.”) (unverified source). 
 13. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 25–26 (D. 
Ryazanoff ed., Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., Russell & Russell 1963) (1848). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 455–
58 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Int’l Publishers Co. 1947) 
(1867). 
 16. IAN WARD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 116 (2d ed. 2004) (citing 
Marx for the proposition that the natural tendency of capitalism is to monopolize). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
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Monopoly is terrible, per Marxism, because oligarchs can exploit workers who 
are essentially helpless in the face of concentrated economic power.19 This 
essential weakness of the exploited individual explains Marxist skepticism 
toward individualism. To Marx, “individual freedom” is not just the freedom to 
starve and be homeless while unemployed; it is also the paralysis of any effort 
to collectively organize the exploited so as to defend themselves from 
concentrated economic power.20 
History shows that the Malthusian predictions of Marxism—ever greater 
market cyclicity leading to global war and revolutions—are mostly inaccurate. 
Marxists underestimated the power of technological innovation and legal 
rationalization to reform capitalism out of deep depression and wars for 
markets and resources. Capitalism reformed itself out of self-destructive global 
wars for markets and resources in the post-war social democratic era due to the 
spate of social democratic legal reforms enacted to forestall another great 
depression and prevent another world war. The U.N., NATO, the EU, the 
UDHR,21 ICCPR,22 ICESCR,23 CERD,24 CEDAW,25 GATT,26 IMF, 27 IBRD,28 
as well as bank insurance (FDIC),29 unemployment insurance, health 
insurance, and national pension plans such as social security were all intended 
to prevent another economic depression, mass unemployment, and consequent 
world war. Although the Malthusian predictions of Marxism proved false, the 
 
 19. See ANTHONY BREWER, MARXIST THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL SURVEY 50–
51 (2d ed. 1990). 
 20. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LEBOWITZ, BEYOND CAPITAL: MARX’S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
THE WORKING CLASS 122–23 (2d ed. 2003). 
 21. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
 22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
 23. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
 24. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted and opened for signature and ratification Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx. 
 25. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification and accession Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available 
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm. 
 26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf (forerunner to the World Trade 
Organization). 
 27. INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 28. INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., http://go.worldbank.org/SDUHVGE5S0 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 29. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
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Marxist prediction of a natural tendency of capital to monopolize seems 
accurate because monopolistic production is generally more efficient.30 
Nevertheless, capitalist economies do not feature ever more extreme and ever 
more rapid economic cyclicity (hysteresis) triggering global war and global 
revolution, at least not since 1945.31 Capitalism in the developed world seems 
to have mostly tamed the business cycle and to have definitively de-linked 
economic cycles from war for markets and resources: the 2008 great recession 
did not unleash any war among the developed countries, at least not so far. 
2. Marxist Legal Theory 
Marxism argues that the economic base, the material conditions of 
production, generally determine the ideological superstructure, and that the 
ideological superstructure merely justifies and rationalizes the relations of 
productive forces.32 Marxism sees private property as the final mechanism of 
oppression and a source of separation between men.33 To Marx the state is 
merely the executive committee of the bourgeoisie.34 Capitalist law, per 
Marxism, is purely formal,35 an illusion,36 which justifies exploitation by a 
dominant class over a dominated class.37 Thus, Marx wanted to abolish the 
state and its laws. Consequently, Marxist legal theory is fundamentally 
antinomian.38 None of this is part of United Russia’s worldview, but partly 
explains why Russia has difficulty forming itself as a rule of law state. 
 
 30. See BREWER, supra note 19, at 24. 
 31. See Steve Keen, Is Capitalism Inherently Unstable?, PIERIA (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/is_capitalism_inherently_unstable. 
 32. See KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 20 
(Maurice Dobb ed., S.W. Ryazanskaya trans., 1970). 
 33. JEAN-MARIE PONTIER, LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES 136 (1997). 
 34. MARX & ENGELS, supra note 13, at 28. 
 35. JEAN-JACQUE VINCENSINI, LE LIVRE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 186 (Robert Laffont ed., 
1985) (“For Marxists, these freedoms are essentially ‘formal’ in the sense that they would be 
empty of any real substance, and therefore, pure form.”). 
 36. Eric Engle, Human Rights According to Marxism, 65 GUILD PRAC. 249, 255 & n.10 
(2008) (“Civil rights are merely the rights of the bourgeoisie.” (quoting PHILOSOPHISCHES 
WORTERBUCH 780 (Georg Klaus & Manfred Buhr eds., 1974))). 
 37. JEAN ROCHE & ANDRÉ POUILLE, LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES 11 (11th ed. 1995). 
 38. EVGENY BRONISLAVOVICH PASHUKANIS, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & MARXISM 
61 (Chris Arthur ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1978) (“The 
withering away of certain categories of bourgeois law (the categories as such, not this or that 
precept) in no way implies their replacement by new categories of value, capital and so on.”). 
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B. The Soviet Union 
1. Soviet Law 
Having understood the basics of Marxist economics, we can now proceed 
to try to understand the USSR. We examine Soviet law to understand some of 
the reasons why contemporary Russia has difficulty forming a rule of law state. 
a. Antinomianism in Soviet Law 
The basic problem facing Soviet law was the fact that its teleology was the 
dissolution of the state into society. Antinomianism undermined the concept of 
the rule of law39 in the Soviet system: Why build the rule of law if the 
objective of state power and the inevitable trend of history is the 
transformation of state power into social peace? Furthermore, for Pashukanis, 
the leading Soviet legal theorist, the rule of law is a mirage used to delude the 
working class.40 Thus, “socialist legality,”41 the attempt to implement the 
formal rule of law42 to govern ordinary transactions of daily life43 in the USSR, 
was doomed from the start due to dictatorship,44 the absence of separation of 
powers,45 political purges,46 and a reign of systematic terror47 during both the 
 
 39. Kazuo Hatanaka, The “Rule of Law” State Notion in the USSR and the Eastern 
Europe—A Comparison with the Japanese Constitutional Experience, RITSUMEIKAN L. REV., 
March 1991, at 1, 1 (“A generally accepted definition of the rule of law is that in order to protect 
the rights and freedoms of the people, the state power should be exercised under the objective law 
which is based on the will of the people.”). 
 40. PASHUKANIS, supra note 38, at 146. 
 41. Hatanaka, supra note 39, at 7 (“[T]he concept of socialist legality originally included the 
observance of the law and other legal norm by the people, as its essential component.”); Pierre 
Lavigne, La Légalité Socialiste et la Développement de la Préoccupation Juridique en Union 
Soviétique, REVUE D’ETUDES COMPARATIVES EST-OUEST, Sept. 1980, at 5, 8–14. 
 42. Hatanaka, supra note 39, at 4–5 (“[Socialist legality is] a principal of strict observance 
and exact exercise of constitution, laws and other acts by all state organ, public servants, social 
organization and citizen.”). 
 43. The Law of Nov. 30, 1918: On the People’s Courts, Collection of Laws of RSFSR, 1918, 
No. 85, art. 22 (noting that People’s Judges must decide on written law; lacunes to be covered via 
“revolutionary legal conscience”). 
 44. See Karl Marx, Marx to J. Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK 
ENGELS: SELECTED WORKS IN ONE VOLUME 679, 679 (9th prtg. 1986) (“[T]he class struggle 
necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . [and] this dictatorship itself only 
constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society . . . .” (quoting 
Marx in a letter to J. Weydemeyer in New York)). 
 45. Id. at 291 (“The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive 
and legislative at the same time.”); KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSSR 
CONSTITUTION] arts. 35, 59, 67, 81, 91. 
 46. But see Harold J. Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 YALE L.J. 803, 805 
(1947) (containing no reference whatsoever to the trials of 1936 and 1937). 
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Lenin48 and Stalin eras, which literally put the nails into the coffin of the rule 
of law, as shown by the execution of Pashukanis himself—among thousands of 
others. This history makes clear why Russia has difficulty attaining the rule of 
law to this day. 
b. Human Rights to Soviet Law 
Marxist legal theory, though antinomian, is not without teleology. 
Marxism seeks to subordinate the state to society and ultimately replace the 
state with society in order to end exploitation and war.49 Marx saw capitalist 
human rights as progress relative to feudalism.50 Marx regarded human rights 
as necessary for the achievement of socialism.51 Marxist human rights laws are 
collective52 social claims of all persons to substantive goods, subject however 
to the limitations imposed by the material facts and contextualized by history53 
 
 47. Id. (“[T]he courts should not do away with terror—to promise that would be to deceive 
ourselves and others—but should give it foundation and legality, clearly, honestly, without 
embellishments.” (quoting 27 LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS 296 (3d ed. 1932))); N.V. KRYLENKO, 
LENIN ON COURTS 111 (1927). 
 48. Resolution of Council of People’s Commissars of Sept. 5, 1918, Collection of Laws of 
RSFSR, 1918, No. 710 (noting that enemies of the state are to be imprisoned; if necessary, shot). 
See also White Terror, IZVESTIA, Sept. 5, 1918, at 1. 
 49. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 31 (C.P. Dutt ed., 1933). 
 50. Engle, supra note 36, at 254 & n.1 (“Already in his ‘On the Jewish Question’ Marx had 
proven that the so called Human rights are class rights—political emancipation is a great step 
forward but only progress within the exploitative society.” (quoting PHILOSOPHISCHES 
WORTERBUCH 780 (Georg Klaus & Manfred Buhr eds., 1974))). 
 51. Id. at 251–52; see also PHILOSOPHISCHES WORTERBUCH 782 (Georg Klaus & Manfred 
Buhr eds., 1974) (“Human rights are necessary for the transition from capitalism to socialism.”) 
(unverified source). 
 52. Engle, supra note 36, at 254 & n.1 (“The goal of socialist civil rights is neither absolute 
individualism or the loss of the individual within the masse. Rather, fundamental rights contribute 
to the formation of all-round developed harmonious persons.” (quoting PHILOSOPHISCHES 
WORTERBUCH 783 (Georg Klaus & Manfred Buhr eds., 1974))). 
 53. As Frederick Engels wrote: 
Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence from natural laws, but in the 
knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them 
work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature 
and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves—two 
classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in 
reality. . . . Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external 
nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity . . . . The first men who 
separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the 
animals themselves, but each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards 
freedom. 
FREDERICK ENGELS, ANTI-DÜHRING 157 (2d ed. 1959). 
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and the finality of the socialist construction: the abolition of law and the state54 
and the replacement of the state with society.55 Early soviet legislation was 
consequently very open textured, seeking to exhort56 and educate,57 to teach 
the masses to read,58 to participate in political discourse, and to grow as 
 
 54. EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY 61 (Chris Arthur 
ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., 1978) (“The withering away of certain categories of bourgeois law 
(the categories as such, not this or that precept) in no way implies their replacement by new 
categories of proletarian law, just as the withering away of the categories of value, capital, profit 
and so forth in the transition to fully-developed socialism will not mean the emergence of new 
proletarian categories of value, capital and so on. The withering away of the categories of 
bourgeois law will, under these conditions, mean the withering away of law altogether, that is to 
say the disappearance of the juridical factor from social relations.”). 
 55. See ROCHE & POUILLE, supra note 37, at 27 (“The freedoms of 1789 are linked to the 
capitalist regime, the freedoms of the rich.”). 
 56. Csaba Varga, Lenin and Revolutionary Law-Making, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
CULTURES 515, 516 (Csaba Varga ed., 1992) (“The main features typical of revolutionary 
legislation are its very general nature, the fact that the laws and statutory instruments frequently 
take the form of an appeal or a proclamation or a declaratory character or a statement of principle, 
the wording of the clauses, which is clear, fluid and direct, and the often almost total liberty of 
structure, to be noted in particular in the lack of separation between the ‘whereas’ clauses and the 
legal provisions. In general, such legislation has the character of an instrument of revolutionary 
propaganda designed to stimulate and educate, partly because of the language and structure 
adopted for the norms; in other words—to quote an expression of Lenin’s—it suffers from the 
‘formal imperfections’ which characterize the sort of norms which scarcely meet the requirements 
of professional jurists.”). 
 57. 26 V.I. LENIN, Report on the Activities of the Council of People’s Commissars January 
11 (24), in COLLECTED WORKS 455, 464 (George Hanna ed., Yuri Sdobnikov & George Hanna 
trans., 1964) (“[W]e transformed the court from an instrument of exploitation into an instrument 
of education . . . .”). 
 58. N. BUKHARIN & E. PREOBRAZHENSKY, THE ABC OF COMMUNISM 293 (Eden Paul & 
Cedar Paul trans., 1969). The following graph demonstrates the efforts towards literacy: 
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individuals in society.59 The Soviet concept of human rights as hortatory 
claims of groups to collective resources entailing workers’ rights to housing, 
shelter, and medical care are different from the legally binding civil and 
political rights of the Anglo-American concept of human rights. This may 
partly explain why protecting basic human rights in Russia remains difficult 
even today. 
c. The Soviet State 
To understand the cold war, we must understand the Soviet state. The 
USSR was a one-party system, a workers’ and peasants’ dictatorship in 
name,60 directed and led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
The CPSU regarded itself as a vanguard party, the most advanced elements 
(intelligentsia) of the most advanced class (the proletariat), subject to 
democratic centralism and exercising a dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat 
(workers and peasants).61 The CPSU was a centralized, hierarchical party of 
elites directing a centrally planned economy via dictatorship.62 The party elite 
 
Dynamics of Literacy 1897–1979: Population 
Aged 9–49, in Percentages 
Population  1897 1920 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 
Rural M 35.5 52.4 67.3 91.6 99.1 99.6 99.6 
 F 12.5 25.2 35.4 76.8 97.5 99.4 99.5 
 All 23.8 37.8 50.6 84.0 98.2 99.5 99.6 
         
Urban M 66.1 80.7 88.0 97.1 99.5 99.9 99.9 
 F 45.7 66.7 73.9 90.7 98.1 99.8 99.9 
 All 57.0 73.5 80.9 93.8 98.7 99.8 99.9 
         
Total M 40.3 57.6 71.5 93.5 99.3 99.8 99.8 
 F 16.6 32.3 42.7 81.6 97.8 99.7 99.8 
 All 28.4 44.1 56.6 87.4 98.5 99.7 99.8 
Source: Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul’tura v SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1977), 
9; SSSR i zarubezhnye strany, 1987: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1988), 83. 
 59. Varga, supra note 56, at 519 (“Lenin’s theory of the need for legislation to be general in 
character was intended to be applicable only during a transition stage, and carried with it the 
requirement that the subsequent legislation, based on an appraisal of past experience and making 
provision for specific matters, should be more directly dependent on the practical results achieved 
and on the political, social and technical experience acquired in the course of the enforcement of 
existent laws in a creative manner.”). 
 60. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSSR CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (“The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.”). 
 61. See Eric Engle, From Russia with Love: The EU, Russia, and Special Relationships, 10 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 549, 551 (2011). 
 62. Id. 
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of the CPSU (the “nomenklatura”) claimed to govern on behalf of and for the 
benefit of the workers and peasants, i.e. the peoples of the Soviet Union, to 
obtain the well-being of the workers and peasants63 and to prevent the wars for 
market share that capitalism unleashed in economic crises at the trough of 
business cycles.64 The USSR, following Marx’s prescription to transform the 
state into civil society,65 sought to end market relations entirely66 to attain the 
goal of peace and prosperity. The dictatorship of the party on behalf of the 
workers and peasants was justified as necessary to work revolutionary changes 
on their behalf.67 The initial performance of the USSR was in fact remarkable. 
The CPSU ended famine and illiteracy68 that characterized Tsarist Russia69 in 
the USSR, doubling the average life expectancy70 despite purges and a world 
war that in total killed about twenty million Soviet citizens.71 Leninism also 
instituted sex equality.72 In real human terms, such as average life expectancy 
and literacy rates, Leninism was unquestionably progress as compared to 
Tsarism. 
Over time however, the Soviet system degenerated and increasingly 
worked to the benefit of the party establishment (the “nomenklatura”)73 at the 
expense of the broad masses of workers and peasants. Meanwhile, the threat of 
 
 63. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSSR CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (“The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of the whole people, expressing the will 
and interests of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, the working people of all the nations and 
nationalities of the country.”). 
 64. See, e.g., V.I. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 5 (Int’l Publishers 1932) (1917); V.I. 
LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE: BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT 54–55 (Victor J. 
Jerome ed., Joe Fineberg & George Hanna trans., Int’l Publishers 1969) (1902); MARX, supra 
note 15; MARX & ENGELS, supra note 13, at 42–54. 
 65. See FREDERICK ENGELS, SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC 68 (Andrew Moore ed., 
Edward Aveling trans., Mondial 2006) (1880). 
 66. See, e.g., KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSSR CONSTITUTION] art. 4 
(“The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of 
production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the 
abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of 
the exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R.”). 
 67. Engle, supra note 61. 
 68. Id.; see also Boris N. Mironov, The Development of Literacy in Russia and the USSR 
from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries, 31 HIST. EDUC. Q. 229, 243 (1991). 
 69. Engle, supra note 61; see also Jeff Coplon, In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: A 55-Year-
Old Famine Feeds the Right, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 12, 1988, at 30. 
 70. Engle, supra note 61; see also STEPHEN WHITE, RUSSIA GOES DRY: ALCOHOL, STATE, 
AND SOCIETY 43 (1996). 
 71. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 466 (Iain McLean ed., 1996). 
 72. See Engle, supra note 61, at 552; see also GAIL WARSHOFSKY LAPIDUS, WOMEN IN 
SOVIET SOCIETY: EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 136 (1978). 
 73. Engle, supra note 61, at 552; see also MICHAEL VOSLENSKY, NOMENKLATURA: THE 
SOVIET RULING CLASS 240–45 (Eric Mosbacher trans., 1984). 
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invasion diminished. From this perspective, which I call dual de-legitimation, 
we can better understand the sudden, unexpected, and relatively bloodless 
restoration of capitalism74 in Russia. The system, in its own terms, lost 
legitimacy as being no longer necessary (defense against a war which never 
came) or effective (consumer well-being was simply higher in the West, and 
the nightmare of Tsarist famine, illiteracy, and inequality was long past). These 
systemic facts help explain the near bloodless dissolution of the Soviet system. 
2. Soviet Economics 
a. The Planned Economy 
The Soviet planned economy succeeded at shifting the USSR from a semi-
feudal economy facing literal starvation and illiteracy producing but a score of 
basic goods into an industrial economy. However, the newly created industrial 
economy produced a myriad of different goods.75 This production diversity 
doomed the centrally planned economy: an ever-greater variety of products 
made central planning increasingly complex and thus less efficient at 
coordinating production and consumption. The result was suboptimal 
economic performance.76 The USSR’s centrally planned economic production 
system was more appropriate for a semi-feudal industrializing society with few 
goods than for a highly developed industrial economy producing a myriad of 
goods.77 As to the promised workers’ paradise, leisure was assured, but 
consumer goods were always in short supply.78 Quality of goods suffered from 
production deadlines at the end of the five-year planning cycles when 
 
 74. Capitalism is a system of economic production predicated on the private ownership of 
capital. It is distinct from state capitalism wherein capital is held by the state or through public-
private partnerships. Capitalism is also defined as an industrial rather than a feudal mode of 
production. The Tsarist economy was semi-feudal and industrializing. Further, many of its 
economic projects involved heavy state participation (state capitalism). However, the ownership 
of capital in the hands of a financial elite distinguishes Tsarist semi-feudal (state) capitalism from 
the Soviet planned economy. Of course, strong state participation in the economy, directly and 
indirectly, remains a mark of the Russian economy. However, private ownership of capital and 
the role of the Orthodox Church as spiritual guide of the nation were definitively restored in the 
post-Soviet era. Thus I refer to this process as “capitalist restoration” rather than “capitalist 
instauration.” See, e.g., Engle, supra note 61, at 552; see also STEVEN ROSEFIELDE, 
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: CULTURE, WEALTH, AND POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
183 (2002). 
 75. See Eric Engle, A Social-Market Economy for Rapid Sustainable Development, 
GUJARAT NAT’L L. U. J.L. DEV. & POL., Dec. 2009, at 42, 42–55. 
 76. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, BELARUS: PRICES, MARKETS, AND ENTERPRISE REFORM 1 
(1997). 
 77. See LUDWIG VON MISES, ECONOMIC CALCULATION IN THE SOCIALIST 
COMMONWEALTH 4 (S. Adler trans., 1990). 
 78. See Engle, supra note 61, at 568; see also Robert Whitesell, Why Does the Soviet 
Economy Appear to be Allocatively Efficient?, 42 SOVIET STUD. 259, 260–68 (1990). 
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production goals had to be met.79 In sum, the quality of Soviet life did not 
match Western European standards. This was mostly because so much of the 
government’s resources were wasted on building a military-industrial complex 
that did not advance the well-being of Soviet citizens.80 
b. Autarchy 
The Soviet leadership sought to create socialism in one country81 via 
economic autarchy.82 While historically justified by Russia’s history of 
invasion after invasion, autarchy is suboptimal to trade. This, along with the 
inefficiencies of the planned economy, partly explains the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
Pursuant to the policy of autarchy, a ruble currency economic zone was 
created—and the ruble with official exchange rates, not market rates.83 Capital 
restrictions were the norm.84 So were border controls such as customs duties 
and passport checks.85 Autarchy complemented military security by enabling 
independent political choices.86 The Soviet leadership saw military security as 
a precondition to economic security and well-being.87 To circumvent the 
problem of a lack of foreign currency and the inability to use the ruble for 
currency exchanges overseas and related problems arising from the nature of a 
closed economic system, barter in and for real goods was taken up by and 
between the COMECON countries. For example, the USSR would barter with 
Cuba, trading sugar for finished Soviet goods, a practice known as 
countertrade.88 Barter also occurred at the micro-economic level, though not as 
a legitimate de jure instrument of state policy, but as a de facto necessity of 
 
 79. See Engle, supra note 61, at 568; see also Zigurds L. Zile, Consumer Product Quality in 
Soviet Law: The Tried and the Changing, in 2 SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN: SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING THROUGH LAW 183, 202 (Donald D. Barry et al. eds., 1978) (explaining the rising 
quality of Soviet goods between the 1960s and 1970s). 
 80. See Engle, supra note 75. 
 81. J.V. STALIN, The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists, in 
PROBLEMS OF LENINISM 117, 121 (1976). 
 82. Ronald A. Francisco, The Foreign Economic Policy of the GDR and the USSR: The End 
of Autarky?, in EAST GERMANY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 189, 190 (David Childs et al. 
eds., 1989). 
 83. Engle, supra note 61, at 554. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Engle, supra note 61, at 554; see also José F. Alonso & Ralph J. Galliano, Russian Oil-
For-Sugar Barter Deals 1989–1999, in 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 335, 335 (1999). 
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everyday life, albeit of questionable legality.89 “Gifts” however could be 
justified as a “social” and “fraternal” act under the Marxist logic of 
transforming monetary economic compulsion into cooperative voluntary social 
acts.90 However, with capitalist restoration, the primitive version of a “gift 
economy” became warped into generalized bribery, undermining the rule of 
law in the post-Soviet era.91 
Preferential tariff treatment for the COMECON and Soviet client states 
was a key feature of the international trade policy of the Socialist bloc.92 High 
tariff barriers were created to protect the autarchic COMECON home market.93 
These tariff barriers would also encourage infant industries. Non-tariff 
technical barriers such as restrictions on imports for health and safety reasons 
also served the logic of autarchy. Intellectual property would be either 
unprotected or weakly protected in order to use Western innovation to support 
the USSR.94 Software piracy of Western computer technology software and 
microchip technology was the norm during the Soviet era95 and intellectual 
property law enforcement in Russia remains a sore spot to this day.96 The 
centrally planned economy aimed to accumulate the surplus capital needed for 
economic development through the creation of infrastructure (e.g., housing, 
 
 89. Engle, supra note 61, at 554–55; see also JIM LEITZEL, RUSSIAN REFORM 128 (1995); 
Byung-Yeon Kim, Informal Economy Activities of Soviet Households: Size and Dynamics, 31 J. 
COMP. ECON. 532, 545 n.24 (2003). 
 90. Engle, supra note 61, at 555. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also MARIE LAVIGNE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIALISM 
174–75 (David Lambert trans., 1991); ADAM ZWASS, THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC 
ASSISTANCE: THE THORNY PATH FROM POLITICAL TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 8 (1989). 
 93. Engle, supra note 61, at 555. COMECON (also known as the CMEA) was the USSR’s 
effort to form a common market within the Soviet bloc. See, e.g., JENNY BRINE, COMECON: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION, at xvi (1992). 
 94. Engle, supra note 61, at 555. Intellectual property remains but is weakly protected in the 
Russian federation and  the USSR successor states. As noted by the European Union 
Commission: 
[C]ounterfeiting and piracy activity in Russia remains on a high level. The lack of 
effective enforcement affect Russian markets on a large scale. To be fully integrated in the 
world trading system, to continue to attract foreign investment and to prevent major losses 
for right-holders, Russia has to implement all its international obligations, in particular the 
ones related to Intellectual Property Rights and their Enforcement. 
Directorate-General for Trade, Intellectual Property: Dialogues, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec. 
europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/dialogues/#_russia (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 95. Engle, supra note 61, at 555; see also Shane Hart, Computing in the Former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, CROSSROADS, March 1999, at 23, 23–25. 
 96. Engle, supra note 61, at 555–56; see also REPORT ON THE PROTECTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 17 (2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_1 
50789.pdf. 
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roads, airports) via forced saving97 and also, more ominously, for military 
production in order to wage war. 
C. The Cold War 
As seen, there were essential fundamental differences between 
individualist capitalist liberalism and Marxist dictatorship. These ideological 
and economic differences manifested in the Cold War. The Cold War was 
characterized by constant conflict, overt and covert. Arms control was a 
perennial political issue of the Cold War to prevent or limit the arms race, and 
arms control remains a key issue with respect to Russia today.98 
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. expressed their Cold War conflicts through proxy 
wars, most notably in Korea, Vietnam, Israel, and Afghanistan, as well as in 
dozens of smaller conflicts over several decades.99 State-sponsored terrorism 
was also a feature of the Cold War. The admitted examples are the U.S. 
funding of anti-Marxist rebels in Nicaragua (Contras) and Mujahadeen in 
Afghanistan,100 but it is fairly obvious that groups such as the Red Brigades, 
the Japanese Red Army, and the Red Army Faction,101 as well as the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, obtained covert funding, covert weapons 
deliveries, and covert training by the USSR102 and/or China (including the 
inter-Marxist conflict via covert action in the ZAPU, ZANU, and ANC). In the 
background was the constant threat of atomic war, and this is likely to feature 
in the cold peace. Each system sought to avoid such a war through the UN, 
alliance networks, and diplomacy, yet both were based on a military industrial 
complex, which fostered the conflict. 
Geopolitically, the Soviet system can be described as a series of concentric 
rings. At the center was the USSR, then Eastern Europe,103 then Third World 
 
 97. For a detailed explanation of the import substitution industrialization model in the 
context of Soviet development theory, see Engle, supra note 75. 
 98. Shannon N. Kile, Mar. 10: Making a New START in Russian-U.S. Nuclear Arms 
Control, STOCKHOM INT’L PEACE RES. INST., http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/ 
march10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 99. Julia Gallivan, U.S. Proxy War Policy During the Cold War, INTRO TO GLOBAL SEC. 
(Feb. 26, 2013, 2:10 AM), http://introglobalsecurity.blogspot.com/2013/02/us-proxy-war-policy-
during-cold-war.html. 
 100. Steve Galster, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973–1990, NAT’L SEC. 
ARCHIVE (Oct. 9, 2001), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html. 
 101. Nick Lockwood, How the Soviet Union Transformed Terrorism, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 
23, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/how-the-soviet-
union-transformed-terrorism/250433/. 
 102. Andrew Campbell, Moscow’s Gold: Soviet Financing of Global Subversion, NAT’L 
OBSERVER, Autumn 1999, at 19, 19–20. 
 103. See JOSEPH G. WHELAN & MICHAEL J. DIXON, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD: THREAT TO WORLD PEACE? 7–9 (1986). 
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Marxist states, and finally Third World non-Marxist allies.104 The closer a 
country was geographically to the Soviet center, the greater the level of 
integration into the autarchic economy. Western efforts to “rollback” Marxism 
were generally unsuccessful,105 perhaps because the Soviet system was 
autarchic. The failure of “rollback” ultimately led to the “Brezhnev doctrine,” 
wherein the USSR declared the attainment of “socialism” in any country as 
irreversible.106 Russia today, incidentally, has no such global network, only 
regional partners in its defensive alliance the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO).107 
The U.S. response to the failure of rollback and the Brezhnev doctrine was 
to compete in fields where the USSR could not compete due to technological 
inferiority or its structure as a closed dictatorship; prominent examples were 
computers and telecommunication.108 Consequent to this asymmetric arms 
race, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies wasted almost all their surplus 
production on unproductive military spending,109 trying to make up for quality 
differences with quantity, just as Russia today tries to use nuclear weapons to 
compensate for its technological inferiority. The U.S. aimed to bankrupt the 
USSR by forcing it into an unsustainable arms race, a policy that worked110—
and in my estimate would work again. The arms race was most evident in the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”) which sought to create a 
missile shield against the USSR.111 The SDI certainly violated the spirit of the 
since-abrogated Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and probably the letter of 
the treaty as well.112 The U.S. also funded anti-Soviet insurgencies, most 
 
 104. Engle, supra note 61, at 553. 
 105. See PETER GROSE, OPERATION ROLLBACK: AMERICA’S SECRET WAR BEHIND THE IRON 
CURTAIN 210 (2000). 
 106. See MATTHEW J. OUIMET, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN SOVIET 
FOREIGN POLICY 1–3, 6 (2003). 
 107. Richard Weitz, Moscow’s Afghan Endgame, HUDSON INST. (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.hudson.org/research/10399-moscow-s-afghan-endgame. 
 108. See Engle, supra note 61, at 557. 
 109. Russian Military Budget, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
world/russia/mo-budget.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (“By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union 
devoted between 15 and 17 percent of its annual gross national product to military spending . . . . 
Until the early 1980s, Soviet defense expenditures rose between 4 and 7 percent per year.”). See 
also ANDERS ÅSLUND, BUILDING CAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET 
BLOC 131 (2002). 
 110. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COLD WAR 862–63 (Ruud van Dijk ed., 2008) (unverified 
source). 
 111. 4 CATHAL J. NOLAN, THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 1600 (2002). 
 112. See Donald G. Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI–ABM 
Treaty Conflict, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 31–32 (1987). 
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evidently in Afghanistan and Nicaragua.113 The economic strains on the Soviet 
system, which resulted from the arms race and proxy wars, led to constant 
shortages that seriously undercut the USSR’s claim to be creating a workers’ 
paradise with the highest standard of living for ordinary people on earth.114 
“The party of Lenin,” despite initial success, was ultimately unable to match 
capitalism in the quality and abundance of consumer goods.115 This, coupled 
with the increasing tendency of the nomenklatura to serve its own interest 
rather than to seek the well-being of all the Soviet peoples and the fact that the 
U.S. was not in fact threatening to invade the USSR to seize resources, led to a 
crisis of purpose, a crisis of legitimacy, and capitalist restoration resulting in 
chaotic and often criminal privatization. 
II.  FROM COLD WAR TO COLD PEACE 
A. Economic Collapse and Corruption 
The collapse of the USSR was marked by chaos, corruption, and economic 
failure116 and was followed by asset stripping and mafia wars, which resulted 
in declining average life expectancy in Russia during the 1970s.117 The U.S. at 
least tolerated criminal tendencies of certain Russian classes118 if only because 
much legitimate economic activity was defined as economic crime by Soviet 
 
 113. WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, CASEBOOK VÖLKERRECHT § 399 (Beck ed., 2005) 
(unverified source). 
 114. 31 V.I. LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS 516 (Julius Katzer ed., 1966) (“Communism is 
Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.”). That is, the Soviet system justified 
itself as the fastest route to development, which it was for at least one generation. However, 
ultimately, the system lost legitimacy as it became clearer and clearer that the West produced 
better quality consumer goods and in greater numbers. 
 115. See ALEX F. DOWLAH & JOHN E. ELLIOTT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SOVIET SOCIALISM 
182 (1997). 
 116. See Privatization: Lessons from Russia and China, INT’L LAB. ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ent/papers/emd24.htm (last visited June 25, 2014) 
(“By the beginning of 1997 the Russian economy had perhaps reached its lowest point. GNP fell 
by 6 per cent [sic] in 1996, compounding a decline of more than 50 per cent [sic] since 1991 
(although the shadow economy has expanded). Many enterprises are on the brink of collapse; the 
proportion of loss-making enterprises in the main economic sectors is approximately 43 per cent 
[sic].”). 
 117. See Donald A. Barr & Mark G. Field, The Current State of Health Care in the Former 
Soviet Union: Implications for Health Care Policy and Reform, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 307, 308 
(1996). 
 118. See Carlos Escude, When Security Reigns Supreme: The Postmodern World-System vis a 
vis Globalized Terrorism and Organized Crime, in TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE WORLD 
SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE 69, 85 (Ryszard Stemplowski ed., 2002); ALFRED W. MCCOY, THE 
POLITICS OF HEROIN: CIA COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE 385 (1991). 
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standards:119 All Russian economic actors in the early 1990s were “criminals,” 
at least according to Soviet law. 
B. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
The CIS arose in the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of the USSR.120 
Unlike the USSR, the CIS never had well-articulated goals. The CIS leaders 
and the contending factions within and outside of the nomenklatura lacked a 
unifying ideology and policy program in the face of the literal bankruptcy of 
Marxism.121 Lacking a common teleology or goal, the CIS degenerated into the 
political overseer of the peaceful dissolution of the USSR122 and, to a certain 
extent, the introduction of market mechanisms to replace the planned economic 
system. The CIS is typically described as “moribund,”123 and it failed to evolve 
into a viable transnational governing institution due to a lack of a common 
vision124 and inexperience in transnational institutionalism,125 particularly with 
 
 119. See WILLIAM A. CLARK, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN SOVIET OFFICIALDOM: 
COMBATING CORRUPTION IN THE POLITICAL ELITE, 1965–1990, at 9 (1993). 
 120. Michael Roberts & Peter Wehrheim, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Accession of 
CIS Countries, 36 INTERECONOMICS 315, 315 (2001) (“Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union most of its successor states, with the exception of the Baltic States, joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the same time many CIS countries opened up 
their trade regimes by dismantling various trade restrictions, state trading monopolies, multiple 
exchange rate regimes as well as formal tariff barriers. However, in the course of the 1990s 
pressure for the protection of domestic industries has increased. Import tariffs on ‘sensitive 
imports,’ such as refined sugar, have started to pop up. By far the most serious barriers to trade 
and the ones most frequently used are non-tariff barriers. The ever more complex and constantly 
changing trade regimes of many CIS countries have also opened the door for corruption and 
smuggling.”). 
 121. STEPHEN K. BATALDEN & SANDRA L. BATALDEN, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 
OF EURASIA: HANDBOOK OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 19 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the 
factional conflict within the RSFSR at formation of the CIS); Georgi M. Derluguian, The Process 
and the Prospects of Soviet Collapse: Bankruptcy, Segmentation, Involution, in QUESTIONING 
GEOPOLITICS: POLITICAL PROJECTS IN A CHANGING WORLD-SYSTEM 203, 215 (Georgi M. 
Derluguian & Scott L. Greer eds., 2000) (discussing factionalism within the nomenklatura); Boris 
Grushin, The Emergence of a New Elite: Harbinger of the Future or Vestige of the Past?, in THE 
NEW ELITE IN POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE 53, 57 (Vladimir Shlapentokh et al. eds., 
1999) (discussing a lack of vision among Russia’s political parties and their leaders). 
 122. Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 120, at 323 (“Ten years after the break up of the 
USSR, CIS countries are still struggling to find the appropriate format to govern their mutual 
trade relations. At present a patchwork of half-implemented bilateral agreements and a series of 
paper framework agreements govern intra-CIS trade relations. Most of the RTAs among CIS 
member states remain de jure agreements. If one were to characterise this institutional 
framework, one might term it ‘managed disintegration.’”). 
 123. See Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.global 
security.org/military/world/int/cis.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 124. Joop de Kort & Rilka Dragneva, Department of Economics Research Memorandum 
2006.03: Russia’s Role in Fostering the CIS Trade Regime 9 (Leiden Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Res. 
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regards to market liberalization126 and the rule of law. Moreover, some of the 
new managerial class were Soviet era “economic criminals,”127 while others 
were former nomenklatura. The CIS’s failure is unsurprising, and was perhaps 
even inevitable given those conditions.128 Lacking a common vision, the CIS 
defaulted into the role of the clearinghouse for the USSR’s remarkably 
peaceful dissolution via two distinct factors: (1) privatization, and (2) the 
devolution of former federal powers to individual Republics.129 
The institutional problems mentioned contributed to the breakdown of CIS. 
For example, the CIS’s transnational trade policy was characterized by 
incoherence. Numerous overlapping multilateral and bilateral treaties covered 
similar issues,130 leading to economic disputes due to the contradictory 
obligations imposed by the various treaties. However, these overlapping 
multilateral and bilateral treaties also left many issues unaddressed.131 For 
example, the CIS’s agreements were not sophisticated enough to take into 
 
Memorandum 2006.03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440809 (“The CIS was burdened 
with ambivalent goals. On the one hand, it aimed to assist the newly independent countries to 
gain economic independence, while on the other hand it was the intended institution to bring the 
newly independent states together in an economic union. The ambivalent character of the CIS, 
and the increasing self-consciousness, both politically and economically, of the newly 
independent states, resulted in numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements at the same time.”). 
 125. See Margot Light, International Relations of Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, in EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
64, 65 (2d ed. 1994). 
 126. Philip Hanson, The Economics of the Former USSR: An Overview, in EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, supra note 125, at 43, 43. 
 127. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, Perspectives on Soviet Economic Crime, in SOVIET LAW AND 
ECONOMY 169, 169 (Olimpiad S. Ioffe & Mark W. Janis eds., 1987); Charles A. Schwartz, 
Economic Crime in the U.S.S.R.: A Comparison of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev Eras, 30 INT’L 
COMP. L.Q. 281, 281–82 (1981). 
 128. Nonetheless, its failure was remarkable in that it contributed to the peaceful transition 
from one-party dictatorships to independent republics with varying degrees of democratic 
participatory government. See Stephan Kux, From the USSR to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States: Confederation or Civilized Divorce?, in FEDERALIZING EUROPE?: THE 
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND PRECONDITIONS OF FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS 325, 325 (Joachim 
Jens Hesse & Vincent Wright eds., 1996). 
 129. Id. at 346–47. See also Stephan Kux, Confederalism and Stability in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 387, 390–91 (1993). 
 130. de Kort & Dragneva, supra note 124, at 1 (“What can be observed in the CIS is that 
economic cooperation takes the form of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements of very 
distinct legal quality. From an economic point of view it does not make sense that countries that 
have concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in 1994, an 
agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral free trade agreements with 
their partners as well. It creates overlap, it increases transaction costs, and it obfuscates the status 
of both the multilateral and bilateral agreement.”). 
 131. Id. (“The agreements that are concluded often are partial and selective, while their 
ratification and implementation also is a mixed affair . . . .”). 
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account non-tariff trade barriers such as health, safety, and technical 
restrictions to trade.132 Ultimately, conflicting rules, gaps in rules coverage, 
and non-enforcement133 gutted the CIS treaties of efficacy, created legal 
uncertainty, and increased transaction costs.134 The CIS’s institutions and rules 
were simply ineffective.135 The CIS states were unable to effectively 
implement transnational trade governance due to incoherent rules, absent 
institutionalism, and corruption. Lacking effective rules and institutions, a 
political approach predominated, which only further impeded any effort by the 
CIS partners to maintain productive synergies such as a customs union, a 
common currency, and common health and safety standards. Moreover, the 
frequent use of reservations by CIS member states rendered the agreements 
pointless, impeding legal stability from taking root in CIS institutions.136 
Any effort to bring the USSR’s customs and monetary union into the CIS 
era was thus doomed for several interlocking reasons. There was an absence of 
useful legal concepts such as “basic economic rights” (the four freedoms)137 as 
a necessary means to the desirable end of economic integration to obtain peace 
and prosperity. The absence of legal concepts in the CIS treaties, such as 
subsidiarity, proportionality, and acquired community positions (acquis 
communautaire),138 further crippled the CIS because those are methods of 
coordinating supranational and intergovernmental tendencies in order to attain 
 
 132. Id. at 3 (“The CIS trade regime can be described as a symbiosis between bilateral and 
multilateral regimes, both of which can be described as weak regimes. Bilateral agreements cover 
some key free trade rules, such as tariffs, but remain minimal and quite basic. Non-tariff barriers, 
for instance, are generally left out, as are liberalisation of services or intellectual property to name 
a few issues that have become important in international trade agreements. Disputes are generally 
resolved through consultations.”). 
 133. Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 120, at 319 (“Though most CIS countries have FTAs 
with each other on a bilateral basis, not all of them are practically implemented or enforced.”). 
 134. de Kort & Dragneva, supra note 124, at 2 (“[F]ragmentation poses a danger of rule 
clashes, patchy implementation, and a non-transparent and complex administration of the 
regime.”). 
 135. Id. at 1 (“[Ninety] per cent [sic] of all multilateral documents that create the legal base of 
the CIS, and there are more than 1,000 of them, are ineffective. According to many observers, the 
CIS seems to have failed in becoming an effective framework of economic cooperation and 
(re)integration.“). 
 136. Id. (“[T]he CIS applies the ‘interested party’ principle, which implies that a state could 
choose not to participate in a certain agreement or decision without afflicting its validity.”). 
 137. The central concept to the foundation of the European Union as an economic area is the 
four freedoms (basic rights): the free movement of goods, workers, capital, and enterprises among 
the Member States. See Eric Engle, Europe Deciphered: Ideas, Institutions, and Laws, FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF., Fall 2009, at 63, 75. 
 138. Knud Erik Jorgensen, The Social Construction of the Acquis Communautaire: A 
Cornerstone of the European Edifice, EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS, Apr. 29, 1999, at 1, 2, 
available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1999-005.pdf; Acquis Communautaire, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
30, 2001, 11:52 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm. 
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by accretion the objectives of economic integration.139 Finally, common 
institutions such as the Economic Court of the CIS were weak140 because of an 
absent common will, an absent common goal, and absent common concepts 
and a general failure to form the rule of law state in former Soviet republics. 
C. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)141 
Following the instauration of market mechanisms to replace the planned 
economic system, and because of the continual success of the EU as an 
institution of transnational governance, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan together instituted a customs union known as the “Eurasian 
Economic Community,”142 which has become the “Eurasian Union.” Russian 
efforts to form something like the EU in the former Soviet Union have been 
criticized, notably by Hillary Clinton,143 as “Soviet Union 2.0”144 or a 
“dictators’ club.” Given that Belarus is still an overt dictatorship, the attempt 
by Yanukoyvich in Ukraine to restore dictatorship through draconian anti-
 
 139. de Kort & Dragneva, supra note 124, at 1–3. 
 140. Id. at 2–3 (“[T]he CIS presents a mix of, often overlapping, bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. The picture gets even more complicated as bilateral and multilateral agreements 
often differ in the strength of commitment they require from the signatories. Bilateral agreements 
rarely envision a mechanism for resolving disputes between its parties, relying on negotiations to 
do so. Multilateral agreements on the other hand often do attempt to strengthen the bindingness of 
the commitments undertaken. In 1993, the Treaty of the Economic Union even went as far as to 
strengthen the role of the Economic Court, by requiring that ‘if the Economic Court recognises 
that [. . .] [sic] a member state has not fulfilled its obligation ensuing from the Treaty, this state is 
obliged to take measures connected with the implementation of the decision of the Economic 
Court’. A year later, in 1994, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was concluded which ‘undermines’ 
the position of the Economic Court . . . .”). 
 141. About EurAsEc, ЕврАзЭС, http://www.evrazes.com/en/about/ (last visited Oct. 20, 
2014) (“[H]eads of state Alexander Lukashenko, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, 
Vladimir Putin, Emomali Rakhmon and Islam Karimov made a decision to establish a customs 
union within the EurAsEC framework, with the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and the Russian Federation as initial members. Other EurAsEC member states will join the 
customs union when their economies are ready to take this step.”). 
 142. Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 120, at 321 (“Russia and two other CIS countries—
Kazakhstan and Belarus—established a customs union (CU) in 1995. The Kyrgyz Republic 
joined in March 1996 and Tajikistan joined in 1999. The text of the customs union provided for 
discontinuation of all trade tariffs between member countries, tariffs for trade with other countries 
were adjusted to one level [i.e., harmonized into a common external tariff] and the system of 
privileges was unified. In addition, certain measures were taken to unify tax policy (tax rates and 
application of indirect taxes). The agreements on the customs union called for coordination of 
customs, excise, and value-added dues . . . .”). 
 143. Clover, supra note 10. 
 144. Janukowitsch-Vertrauter: Putin Will Die Sowjetunion neu Errichten, SPIEGEL (Dec. 15, 
2013), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/janukowitsch-vertrauter-putin-will-die-sowjetunion-
neu-errichten-a-939162.html. 
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protest laws,145 and the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, those criticisms 
now have credibility.146 However, the fundamental ideological and economic 
differences between the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation explain why 
the Russian Federation and its alliances and trade networks are not “Soviet 
Union 2.0.” Russia is pursuing a rational policy of power maximization using 
both “hard” military power and “soft” cultural and economic influence, and 
Putin is consolidating political power through limitations on civil and political 
rights. However, United Russia is hardly a vanguard party exercising the all-
around dictatorship of the proletariat, let alone atheist or even undemocratic. 
III.  THE COLD PEACE 
A. Differences Between the Cold War and the Cold Peace 
Although Russia and the West are once again in conflict, the conflicted 
character of current Russian-Western relations is fundamentally different from 
the Cold War. Consequent to these differences, I call this conflicted 
relationship “cold peace,” because as bad as the relations are, they could be 
much worse. The Cold War featured constant covert conflicts, such as proxy 
wars and state-sponsored terrorism throughout the world. It is unlikely that we 
will see a recurrence of such covert conflicts, though, if we do, they will be 
localized to Eurasia and not global. Great Russian corporatist orthodoxy is not 
an ideology that can claim global applicability or global and total antagonism 
to Western liberal democracy, and the Russian global network of bases, trading 
partners, and allies was thoroughly disrupted in the 1990s.147 First we examine 
differences between the cold peace and the Cold War, then similarities. 
1. A Market Economy 
After the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, Russia abandoned 
communism as an ideal and central planning and became a market economy, 
albeit with the state as an important economic actor in key sectors such as 
petroleum (Gazprom, Rosneft) and arms (Rosoboron).148 The absolute clash 
 
 145. Dmytro Gorshkov & Oleksandr Savochenko, Ukraine Leader Signs Controversial Anti-
Protest Law, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 18, 2014), http://my.news.yahoo.com/ukraine-president-signs-
anti-protest-bills-law-official-201313501.html. 
 146. Sergei Guriev, Corruption Has Laid Waste to the Russian Economy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/939659ae-b67d-11e3-b230-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz 
33xhbdDx5 (“Once growth is gone, territorial expansion is an authoritarian regime’s tool of 
choice . . . .”). 
 147. See Alexander A. Pikayev, Russia’s Black Sea Military Bases, in MILITARY BASES: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 165, 165 (L. Rodrigues & S. Glebov 
eds., 2009). 
 148. See Russia Prepares to Attack the Petrodollar, VOICE OF RUSS. (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_04_04/Russia-prepares-to-attack-the-petrodollar-2335/. 
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between two different economic models that characterized the Cold War is 
past. This is reflected in patterns of trade and investment. 
a. Trade (Resources) 
One key difference between the Cold War and the cold peace is the extent 
of trade between Russia and Europe. Whereas the USSR was largely autarchic, 
with very little trade and investment with non-Marxist states, Russia has 
significant trade ties outside of the former Soviet space and has been admitted 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).149 
Russia trades intensively with the European Union (EU),150 which is 
Russia’s largest trading partner,151 although Russia is not Europe’s largest 
trading partner.152 Prior to sanctions, trade between the EU and Russia had 
been growing rapidly,153 due to Russia’s comparative advantage in 
hydrocarbons154 and, to a lesser extent, atomic energy, as well as the 
asymmetric European comparative advantage in certain industrial goods.155 In 
contrast, trade and investment between Russia and the U.S. is virtually non-
existent,156 though U.S. trade with Russia had been growing.157 
 
 149. Eric Engle, The EU, Russia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in 
RUSSIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CIS 1, 39–40 (Eric Engle ed., 2012). 
 150. In 2013 the EU exported €119.8 billion to Russia and imported €206.5 billion from 
Russia. Directorate General for Trade, Russia Statistics, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111720.pdf. 
 151. Trade: Russia, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/russia/ (last visited Oct. 20 2014). The EU is Russia’s main trading partner. It is 
also by far the most important investor in Russia. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Memorandum from the Brussels European Council, Review of EU-Russia Relations 
(Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-678_en.htm (“Trade 
and investment between the EU and Russia are substantial and growing, and it is in our mutual 
interest that this trend should continue. Russia is our third most important trading partner and we 
see growth rates of up to 20% every year. Energy is a major factor, but impressive growth figures 
have also been seen in services. With its sustained high growth rates and emerging middle class, 
Russia is an important emerging market on our doorstep that offers opportunities to EU 
enterprises. The EU is the major investor in Russia, accounting for 80% of cumulative foreign 
investment.”). 
 154. Balance Human Rights & Energy With Russia says Knut Fleckenstein MEP, EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT (June 23, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN& 
type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100618STO76329 (“The European Union’s relationship with 
Russia is one of its most important and most complicated. Strong trade and energy ties bind both 
although many in the EU are concerned about Moscow’s human rights record.”). 
 155. See Trade: Russia, supra note 151. 
 156. In 2013, U.S. exports to Russia were just over ten billion dollars ($11.1B) and imports 
just over twenty-seven billion dollars. U.S. Trade in Goods with Russia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2013), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html. 
 157. Michael A. McFaul, Message From Ambassador McFaul, U.S. EMBASSY, http://mos 
cow.usembassy.gov/acs-amb-message.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
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Most Russian exports are resources,158 particularly petroleum, but also 
gold and diamonds. Russia exports few finished goods.159 However, Russia is 
an energy powerhouse, a key producer of natural gas, oil, and petroleum 
products. Russia’s natural gas reserves account for roughly a quarter of the 
world’s total proven reserves.160 Russia also exports uranium and nuclear 
power plant technology.161 Much of Russia's petroleum resources are in 
regions with significant minority Muslim populations (local majorities, but 
federal minorities).162 Consequent to the separatist war in Chechnya, led by 
Muslim separatists and fought over oil,163 Russia, like the West, faces 
terrorism.164 Thus, Russia and NATO Member States have a common interest 
in the suppression of terrorism, specifically Jihadist terrorism,165 a possible 
point of future cooperation. 
 
 158. Gunther H. Oettinger & Sergey I. Shmatko, Opportunities for Our Future Energy 
Partnership, EU-RUSSIA ENERGY DIALOGUE 2000–2010, Nov. 2010, at 62, 62, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2011_eu-russia_energy_relations.pdf (“The Russian 
Federation is the 3rd biggest world trade partner of the EU (9.7 %), following the US (15.2 %) 
and China (11.4 %). Energy represents 65 % of total EU imports from Russia. Russia is the 
biggest oil, gas, uranium and coal supplier to the EU, and the third biggest electricity supplier. 
31% of total EU gas imports, 27 % of total EU crude oil imports, and 24 % of total EU coal 
imports are supplied from the Russian Federation. In 2009, Russia supplied 30 % of total EU 
uranium imports. 24 % of total EU gas sources are supplied from Russia. For several EU Member 
States, Russia is the only gas source and supplier. At the same time, the EU is by far the largest 
trade partner of the Russian Federation: 45 % of Russia imports originate from the EU, and 55% 
of its exports go to the EU, including 88 % of Russia’s total oil exports, 70 % of its gas exports 
and 50 % of its coal exports. The export of raw materials to the EU represents around 40 % of the 
Russian budget, and the EU represents 75 % of cumulative foreign investments in Russia. In 
terms of infrastructure, Europe is the natural destination for Russian energy exports.”) (from a 
presentation delivered in Brussels/Moscow in November 2010). 
 159. ANDREW WILSON, VIRTUAL POLITICS: FAKING DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-SOVIET 
WORLD 57 (2005) (“Russia doesn’t have many export industries.”). 
 160. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, RUSSIA: COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF 10 
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Russia/russia.pdf. Russia holds 
the world’s largest natural gas reserves and the second largest coal reserves. Id. at 10, 16. Russia 
was the third largest producer of liquid fuels in 2012. Id. at 1. Russia is the second-largest 
producer of natural gas. Id. Russia is also one of the top producers and consumers of electric 
power in the world, with more than 220 gigawatts of installed generation capacity. Id. at 14. 
 161. See Summer Said, U.A.E., Russia Sign Nuclear Deal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2012, 2:09 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324407504578185101605699498. 
 162. See Dipak Basu, The Conflict of Chechnya: The Cause, IVARTA (Sept. 13, 2004), 
http://www.ivarta.com/columns/ol_040913.htm. 
 163. See Craig Pirrong, Russia’s Chechen War: It All Comes Down to Energy Rents, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Apr. 4, 2010, 7:47 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/196964-russia-s-chechen-war-it-
all-comes-down-to-energy-rents. 
 164. See Basu, supra note 162; see also MARX & ENGELS, surpa note 13. 
 165. See Simon Shuster, How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favor, TIME (Sept. 19, 
2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2093529,00.html. 
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The following chart shows the growth of the Russian economy during the 
Putin era, and also the fact that Russia’s exports are mostly raw materials, 
particularly petroleum products, not finished goods.166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166. Dinah Deckstein et al., Promising but Perilous: German Firms Put Off by Russian 
Corruption, SPIEGEL (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
german-investors-discouraged-by-corruption-in-russia-a-892043.html. 
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The existence of significant ties of trade between Russia and other states 
creates mutual dependence,167 which makes covert conflicts such as proxy 
wars and state-sponsored terrorism less likely to occur in the current cold 
peace. While we are facing a new cold peace, we are not yet confronted with a 
new cold war.168 Russia is comparatively autarchic, but unlike the Soviet 
Union it is not absolutely autarchic. 
b. Investment (Sanctions) 
Russia is a resource-based economy because the lack of rule of law repels 
foreign investment. Although Russia can and does sell resources, the 
investment climate in Russia is, frankly speaking, horrible. No prudent pension 
fund manager would invest in Russia for any of the following reasons: 
1) Russia’s sovereign debt default in 1998.169 
2) The quasi nationalization of Yukos.170 
3) The similar, though less serious, squeeze-out of British Petroleum.171 
4) A climate of corruption, both public and private (e.g., “reiderstvo”).172 
5) Imposed and possible economic sanctions.173 
Even speculative investors, who are not risk averse, recognize that 
investing in Russia carries real risks of selective taxation, extortion, 
nationalization, and corruption—and those risks of loss are not offset by the 
possibility of superior profits which might justify the risk. Consequently, 
Russia is undercapitalized, and thus, under industrialized. In an effort to 
industrialize, Russia attempts to force Europe to invest in Russia’s 
secondary174 and tertiary175 markets for Russian energy176 as part of trade-
 
 167. See Europe and Russia’s Resources: “We Are Mutually Dependent on Each Other,” 
SPIEGEL (July 14, 2006, 1:46 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,426555, 
00.html. 
 168. Other scholars disagree and believe we are already in a new cold war. See, e.g., SAKWA, 
supra note 8, at viii. 
 169. See Sebastian Walsh, A History of Debt Defaults: Russia 1998, FIN. NEWS (July 27, 
2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-07-27/a-history-of-debt-defaults-russia-1998? 
ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622. 
 170. Gregory L. White & Bhushan Bahree, Russian Government Sets Plan to Nationalize 
Yukos’s Chief Unit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2004, at A1. 
 171. Julia Werdigier & Andrew E. Kramer, BP to Exit Its Venture in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2012, at B1. 
 172. Carl Schreck, The Danger of Doing Business in Russia, TIME (Dec. 19, 2009), http://con 
tent.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1948140,00.html. 
 173. Isabel Gorst, Russian Economy Staggering as Sanctions Bite, IRISH TIMES (May 2, 2014, 
9:28 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/russian-economy-staggering-as-sanc 
tions-bite-1.1782208. 
 174. Deckstein et al., supra note 166. As the authors argue: 
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deals. However, capital investments into Russia have repeatedly been shown to 
be a poor choice,177 most famously in the case of British Petroleum’s joint 
venture.178 
c. Sanctions 
The Russian economy performs sub-optimally due to a lack of foreign 
investment179 and now outright sanctions.180 Since Russia’s illegal annexation 
of Crimea, the Russian stock market has fallen drastically181 as foreigners have 
further disinvested.182 Capital flight from Russia is illustrated in the chart 
below:183 
  
 
Volkswagen, for example, is already producing VW and Skoda models in two Russian 
plants. VW CEO Martin Winterkorn negotiated directly with Putin about building 
additional plants. “There was a lot of back and forth and hemming and hawing over 
whether or not to do it,” says Winterkorn. In the end, he decided that the company would 
build another engine factory in the western Kaluga region. But the decision was not 
entirely voluntary. 
Id. 
 175. Id. (“With a law known as Decree 166, the Russia government compels foreign 
companies to build their own production plants in the country. High import duties increase the 
cost of models coming in from abroad. But starting in 2016, any automaker that produces at least 
300,000 vehicles in Russia will be allowed to import additional cars at lower import duty rates.”). 
 176. See Europe and Russia’s Resources: “We Are Mutually Dependent on Each Other,” 
supra note 167. 
 177. Andreas Heinrich et al., Foreign Investment and National Interests in the Russian Oil 
and Gas Industry,  14 POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES 495, 503–05 (2002). 
 178. Marin Katusa, Putin Is the New Global Shah of Oil, CASEY RES. (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:29 
AM), http://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/putin-new-global-shah-oil. 
 179. Anders Aslund, Russia Is Losing Sources of Economic Growth, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 
22, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-is-losing-sources-of-
economic-growth/493094.html. 
 180. Gorst, supra note 173. 
 181. Kenneth Rapoza, Post-Ukraine Election, Russia Stocks Fall Off a Cliff, FORBES (May 
27, 2014, 7:36 AM), http://onforb.es/1jW6quT. 
 182. Russian Economy to Grow by 0.5 Percent in 2014—Central Bank’s Nabiullina, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 26, 2014, 6:46 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/05/26/business/26reu 
ters-russia-economy-cenbank.html?hp&_r=0 (“The economy is on the brink of recession after 
quarterly GDP fell by 0.5 percent in the first three months of the year, impacted by sanctions and 
instability resulting from the stand-off with Ukraine and wider emerging market uncertainty.”). 
 183. Erin McCarthy, The Economic Cost of Crisis, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2014, 1:18 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/the-economic-cost-of-crisis-1349/. 
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Sanctions and the crisis in Ukraine caused an economic recession in 
Russia, illustrated in the graphs below:184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 184. Kathrin Hille, Russia Looks for Economic Self-Reliance, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:39 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee5d9120-ca2f-11e3-bb92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34Vo6l 
2H5; Mark Thompson, Recession Warning for Russia, CNN (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:55 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/26/news/economy/russia-economy-world-bank/. Note: these 
estimates presume that sectoral sanctions will not be introduced, and that the global economic 
recovery will continue. 
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Sanctions also caused the Russian stock market to lose about 40 billion 
euros worth of value:185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and have also led to a significant decline in value of the Russian ruble.186 
  
 
 185. Phillip Inman et al., Ukraine Crisis Sends Russian Stock Market Tumbling, £34bn Wiped 
Off Shares Listed in Moscow as Investors Respond to Russia’s Intervention in Crimea, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/ukraine-
crisis-russian-stock-market-falls/print. 
 186. Moran Zhang, Russia’s 2014 Economic Outlook Bleak Amid Toughening Western 
Sanctions, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:31 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/russias-2014-
economic-outlook-bleak-amid-toughening-western-sanctions-1563978. 
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In the graph above, the USD-RUB line (upwards rising) indicates the rise 
of the U.S. dollar relative to the Russian ruble. The RHS line (slow 
downwards) indicates the decline in value of the Russian stock market. 
Russia can always sell resources—but sanctions and the higher transaction 
costs associated with corruption lower the price Russia would otherwise have 
obtained for those resources. Although the sanction regime will not force 
Russia to abandon its illegal annexation of Crimea, nor lead to an ouster of 
President Putin, the sanctions may have deterred Russia from further illegal 
annexation of Ukrainian territory. If the sanctions do not deter Russia, they 
will be followed by sectoral sanctions of entire swaths of the Russian 
economy, and possibly also illegal countermeasures, with the aim of ruining 
Russia’s economy, even at the risk of another global recession. 
d. The Energy Weapon? 
Some argue that Russia can use energy pricing and exports as a political 
weapon. However, that does not seem to be the case. For example, despite 
long-term delivery of low cost natural gas, Russian energy policy has had little 
or no influence on Ukraine.187 Furthermore, Russian energy exports are not 
generally driven by geopolitical ambitions, but by the practical fact of who will 
pay the most.188 Even during the Cold War, the USSR did not participate in the 
Arab oil embargos and continued to sell petroleum to the U.S.189 This 
 
 187. See MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, PETROSTATE: PUTIN, POWER, AND THE NEW RUSSIA 144–
45 (2008). 
 188. See id. at 89–90. 
 189. See Dina R. Spechler & Martin C. Spechler, The Soviet Union and the Oil Weapon: 
Benefits and Dilemmas, in THE LIMITS TO POWER: SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 96, 96–
98 (Yaacov Ro’i ed., 1979). 
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experience shows that energy issues are not determinative of foreign relations 
between the Russian Federation and other states but merely constrain outcomes 
because energy dependence is relative, not absolute. 
Russia’s ability to use energy as a political weapon is also limited by the 
fact that there are alternatives to Russian petroleum products. Fractured gas 
(“fracking”),190 shale oil,191 and tar sands192 are potential alternatives to 
Russian hydrocarbons. Solar energy is another, and has become much more 
efficient in the past decades.193 Wind turbines, too, are increasingly 
competitive.194 Atomic energy is also an alternative to Russian 
hydrocarbons.195 Although Germany, at least at present, rejects atomic energy 
for environmental reasons,196 France uses nuclear energy extensively, 
obtaining thereby roughly eighty percent of her electricity.197 It is also 
possible, albeit expensive, to liquefy coal into petroleum products,198 and 
ethanol has been used successfully in Brazil as an alternative automotive 
 
 190. James Herron, Shale Gas Could Fracture Energy Market, WALL ST. J. SOURCE BLOG 
(May 29, 2012, 1:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2012/05/29/shale-gas-could-fracture-
energy-market/. 
 191. John Funk, U.S [sic] Shale Oil Production Growing, Gasoline Could Average $3.38, 
Says U.S. EIA, CLEVELAND.COM (June 11, 2014, 5:03 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/business/ 
index.ssf/2014/06/us_shale_oil_production_growin.htm. 
 192. About Tar Sands, OIL SHALE & TAR SANDS PROGRAMMATIC EIS INFO. CTR., 
http://ostseis.anl.gov/guide/tarsands/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 193. FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN FIGURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8 
(2010), available at http://www.folkecenter.dk/mediafiles/folkecenter/Renewable-Energy-in-Fig 
ures.pdf (“The expansion of renewable energy sources in Germany has been an exemplary 
success. Since 2000, renewable energies’ contribution to final energy supply has increased 2.5-
fold to a level of 10.3%. In the electricity sector, the German Government had originally aimed to 
achieve a 12.5% renewables’ share of gross electricity demand by 2010. This target was already 
surpassed, considerably, by 2007. In 2009, a share of over 16% had been reached.”). 
 194. Id. at 9. 
 195. See Lisa Pham, Considering an Alternative Fuel for Nuclear Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/business/global/20renthorium.html?pagewant 
ed=all. 
 196. Eben Harrell, Germany Decides to Extend Nuclear Power, TIME (Sept. 6, 2010), 
http://science.time.com/2010/09/06/germany-decides-to-extend-nuclear-power/ (“Every [sic] 
since Chernobyl puffed its radioactive plume over Europe in 1986, Germany has been deeply 
suspicious of nuclear power. Opposition to Atomkraft is at the center of the country’s green 
movement, and almost a decade ago the country decided to phase out its nuclear plants by 
2021.”). 
 197. Nuclear Power in France, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ 
inf40.html (last updated July 2014) (“France derives over 75% of its electricity from nuclear 
energy. This is due to a long-standing policy based on energy security.”). 
 198. Sasol’s Synthetic Fuels Go Global, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Mar. 16, 2007), 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/success/sasol-130307.htm#.U_pu4Ch3f0A. 
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fuel.199 In sum, energy dependence of countries such as the United States or 
Germany on petroleum imports is only relative. There are alternative energy 
sources. Thus, energy policy is of limited use as a political instrument. 
Similarly, although Russia has large gold reserves and diamonds,200 selling 
those resources would flood the market and drive the price of gold and 
diamonds down. Russian gold reserves and diamonds are certainly valuable, 
but less valuable than one might estimate. In sum, Russia’s resources do not 
seem to be particularly useful as instruments of Russian foreign policy. 
2. Democratic Legitimation 
The existence of genuine democratic legitimacy of the Russian government 
is another key difference between the Cold War and the cold peace. Putin has 
genuine support of a majority of Russians201 and does not need to engage in 
systematic flagrant voting fraud202 to win elections because he has developed a 
coherent Great Russian corporatist orthodox ideology, which appeals to a 
majority of Russian voters. Although the illegal annexation of Crimea came as 
a surprise to the West,203 it only strengthened Putin’s domestic democratic 
legitimacy and increased Putin’s approval rating from roughly sixty percent to 
roughly eighty percent of Russians surveyed.204 
 
 199. Larry Rohter, With Big Boost from Sugar Cane, Brazil Is Satisfying Its Fuel Needs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 200. See R.J. Wilcox, From Russia With Gold, MINING.COM (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.min 
ing.com/from-russia-with-gold-54907/. 
 201. See, e.g., Richard Rose, Putin in Perspective, Presentation at the University of 
Strathclyde Glaslow and Centre for the Study of Public Policy Scottish Russia Forum (Mar. 22, 
2012) (powerpoint notes available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2158 
614). 
 202. But see James Melik, Russia’s Growth Stifled by Corruption, BBC NEWS (June 28, 
2012, 7:05 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18622833 (“But some foreign investors are 
worried about Mr Putin’s return as head of state for another term of six years after allegations of 
vote-rigging and protests both before and following his re-election.”). 
 203. Guriev, supra note 146. 
  Russia’s annexation of Crimea came as a great surprise. After all, Russia was long 
thought to be a “normal” developing country. True, it was governed by an undemocratic 
regime—but it was well on its way to bridging the gap with the west. 
  However, what happened in Crimea is anything but “normal”. The last country to 
annex a neighbour’s territory was Iraq, which took over Kuwait in 1990. Russia is 
certainly not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But it stands out in one respect—it is a high-income 
country that is also very corrupt. According to Worldwide Governance Indicators, Russia 
ranks among the top fifth of most corrupt countries—on a par with far poorer parts of the 
world. 
Id. 
 204. Putin’s Approval Rating Rises to 80% –Poll, RIANOVOSTI (Mar. 26, 2014, 5:21 PM),  
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140326/188776004/Putins-Approval-Rating-Rises-to-80--Poll.html. 
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3. Market Economy 
Another key difference between the old Cold War and the current cold 
peace is that the Russian economy, though still featuring significant state 
ownership,205 is a market economy. Ownership and transfers of capital are no 
longer completely forbidden or even heavily regulated, though Putin is seeking 
to compel repatriation of Russian owned capital which has fled Russia,206 
arguing that doing so is an anti-corruption measure207 because offshore 
banking fosters tax evasion.208 The state is still an owner of some key 
industries, notably in the petroleum sector. However, state owned assets are 
being opened for partial private ownership by stock market offerings via initial 
public offerings,209 usually with retention of a Russian government owned 
“golden share.”210 Thus, contemporary Russian state-capitalism is definitely 
not the “commanding heights” theory211 of Lenin’s “new economic policy”212 
and is much closer to a social democratic corporatist model than to the planned 
economy of the USSR. 
B. Similarities Between the Cold War and the Cold Peace 
Despite the rise of democracy and the development of a market economy, 
deep divisions still separate Russia from the West and explain why we are 
currently in a cold peace. Visa travel restrictions,213 espionage,214 diplomatic 
 
 205. William Tompson, Back to the Future? Thoughts on the Political Economy of Expanding 
State Ownership in Russia, CAHIERS RUSSIE, no. 6, 2008, at 1, 3–4. 
 206. For a discussion of capital flight mechanisms, see Alena V. Ledeneva, ‘Underground’ 
Banking in Russia, 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 268, 268–73 (2002). 
 207. Russia Launches Crackdown on Government Worker’s Offshore Accounts, RT (Apr. 4, 
2013, 8:15 PM), http://rt.com/business/offshore-russia-accounts-crackdown-353/. 
 208. See Putin Backs Foreign Capital Repatriation, FOREXTRADING24 (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://forextrading24.co.uk/news/putin-backs-foreign-capital-repatriation/. 
 209. Nadia Popova & Alexander Kolyandr, Timing Is Key for Russia’s IPO Hopefuls, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870455 
9904576230653554503480. RosNeft is one example. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Polishes 
Rosneft IPO in Time for G-8 – Business – International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-rosneft.2194078.html? 
_r=0. 
 210. Neil Buckley, Russia State Sell-Offs Must Offer Control, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 
5:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f3a088a-0886-11e2-b37e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2u 
RcTWRrz. 
 211. On Lenin’s New Economic Policy, see Nikolay Nenovsky, Lenin and the Currency 
Competition: Reflections on the NEP Experience (1922—1924) (Int’l Ctr. of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 22, 2006), available at http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2006/ICERwp22-06.pdf. 
 212. RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 6 (4th ed. 2008). 
 213. Robert Bridge, US-Russia Visa Row Heats Up, RT (July 28, 2011), http://rt.com/politics/ 
us-visa-russia-reset-washington-moscow/. 
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collisions,215 sporadic saber rattling,216 blacklists of persona non grata, and 
even occasional exceptional proxy conflicts such as Georgia, Syria, and 
Ukraine217 are features of the cold peace. 
The first similarity between the Cold War and the cold peace we explore is 
ideological. Ideology influences all other issues both in their perception and in 
the actions the ideologue takes based on its ideology, at least to the extent the 
ideologue believes its own propaganda. Marxism-Leninism and historical 
materialism directed the Soviet system, at least in theory. Putin’s Russia is 
similarly led by an ideology that I describe as Great Russian Orthodox 
corporatism, which sees itself in a “clash of civilizations.” 
1. Ideology: Great Russian Orthodox Corporatism in a Clash of 
Civilizations 
Putin justifies Russia’s conflicted foreign relations by an ideology of Great 
Russian Orthodox corporatism, which sees itself in a clash of civilizations.218 I 
describe each of these elements below in detail. 
a. Great Russian, Nationalist, Inclusive, Expansive 
By Great Russian I mean Rossiskiy:219 the Russian nation220 defined 
around language rather than around race. This is a nationalist, inclusive, and 
expansive ideology. Nationalist because it defines itself as a nation at least as 
much as a State—the nation constitutes the state, and the state defends the 
 
 214. See, e.g., Miriam Elder, Russia Reveals Identity of CIA Moscow Chief Following Ryan 
Fogle’s Expulsion, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013, 1:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/may/17/russia-reveal-identity-cia-moscow-chief. 
 215. See Sean Sullivan, Ambassador McFaul: Russians Have Leaked My Conversations, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/09/ 
ambassador-mcfaul-russians-have-leaked-my-conversations/. 
 216. Andrew Higgins & Steven Lee Myers, As Putin Orders Drills in Crimea, Protesters’ 
Clash Shows Region’s Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A12. NATO likewise has recently 
held provocative drills. Adrian Croft & Aija Krutaine, NATO War Games Worry Moscow, 
REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-nato-exercise-
idUSBRE9A517P20131106. 
 217. See Spencer Kimball, US-Russian Tensions over Ukraine Threaten Cooperation on 
Syria, Iran, DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 14, 2014), http://dw.de/p/1ByuX. 
 218. See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, Russia’s “Orthodox” Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 363 
(2011). 
 219. See Stephen Fidler, Putin Depicts Russia as a Bulwark against European Decadence, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/20/putin-depicts-
russia-as-a-bulwark-against-european-decadence/. 
 220. Russia is a vast multi-ethnic land with a population of over 140 million people and more 
than 190 different ethnic nationalities. See ALL-RUSSIAN 2010 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/pub-04-01.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
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nation.221 Inclusive because the national idea seeks to include all Russian 
speakers222 and even all Slavs in the idea of nation (“narod”). Expansive 
because this nationalist ideology seeks to express itself in the following ways: 
1. Politically with hard power (including an information war)223 in places such 
as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and Novo Rossiya; 
2. Culturally with soft power224 in other Slavic countries or indeed anywhere 
there is a Russian language minority;225 and 
3. Economically, notably through the policies of Gazprom and RosNeft.226 
This is a coherent ideology, not racist ravings or a conspiracy theory, but 
with no tenable claim as a universal model for global governance, unlike 
Marxism or liberalism. 
 
 221. See EARNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (1983). 
 222. Russia Military Looks to Recruit More Foreigners, RIANOVOSTI (Nov. 25, 2010, 2:02 
PM), http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20101125/161492830.html. 
 223. Andrew Wilson, “Virtual Politics” in the Ex-Soviet Bloc, OPENDEMOCRACY (July 17, 
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Information wars are alive and well in Russia, but in this sphere the Kremlin’s monopoly 
is less secure. Whereas the main oligarchs are in at least temporary retirement from 
running party “projects” since the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, they need to 
maintain media influence to run information wars for commercial purposes. Moreover, 
there is no logical reason why Putin’s settlement with the oligarchs could have been 
backdated to the destruction of kompromat. On the contrary, rival groups can be expected 
to have kept whatever materials they had, and the Kremlin has not been able to choke off 
the supply of new kompromat, which often comes through privatised KGB services. Also, 
the deliberately arbitrary nature of Russian law “enforcement” (the “principle of 
suspended punishment”) means it would be advisable to bolster up defences. 
Id. 
 224. Id. (“New types of political technology and even ‘soft power’ have also been deployed. 
The authorities are now much better attuned to the use and abuse of the internet than they were in 
2004. Russia allegedly launched a ‘cyberwar’ on Estonia in May 2007 during the row over the 
shifting of a Soviet war monument. Fake supporters for Russia-friendly initiatives now appear on 
the net. The Kremlin has promoted the Proryv (‘Corporation’), a sort of paramilitary NGO 
umbrella, in Russia’s ‘near abroad’; and the Nashi franchise, designed as a mirror-image of 
‘coloured’ opposition youth movements such as Ukraine’s Pora or Georgia’s Kmara!.”). 
 225. See Международный совет российских соотечественников выступил в защиту 
русского языка на Украине и выразил свой решительный протест против массированного 
наступления национал-радикалов на права русскоязычного населения Украины!, МСРС 
Русский мир Русский язык Соотечественники Украина (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.msrs.ru/ournews/2014-02-14. 
 226. See Isabel Gorst, Rosneft and Gazprom: Two Behemoths Battle It Out, FIN. TIMES (July 
2, 2014, 2:26 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/07/02/rosneft-and-gazprom-two-
behemoths-battle-it-out/?. 
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b. Orthodox 
I call United Russia’s ideological mix Orthodox because Putin has placed 
the Russian Orthodox Church as the moral anchor and center of his 
policies227—thus setting Russia rather inevitably in conflict (but not 
necessarily armed conflict) with Islamic republics,228 and also as distinct from 
Catholic or Protestant Western Europe. I refer to Putin’s ideology as 
corporatist because it has elements of state capitalism.229 This mix of ideas is 
meant to shore up the domestic legitimacy of Putin and United Russia230 by 
invoking Great Russian nationalism and the Orthodox Church to rally a 
majority of Russian people around Putin and United Russia in order to forestall 
any U.S. effort to instigate a “color revolution.”231 I call this “authoritarian 
democracy”232—it is popular as in populist.233 However, it excludes those who 
 
 227. See, e.g., Russia Moves to Enact Anti-Gay Law Nationwide, DAILY HERALD (Jan. 21, 
2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20130121/news/701219861/ (“The 
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 228. See Alexei Khlebnikov, The Islamic World—‘The Clash of Civilizations’—Russia, 
ISLAM.RU (July 18, 2011), http://islam.ru/en/content/story/islamic-world-clash-civilizations-
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 229. See RICHARD SAKWA, PUTIN: RUSSIA’S CHOICE 242 (1st ed. 2004). 
 230. See Maria Shabanova, Rights of LGBT Minorities in Russian Law and Practice, in 
RUSSIA AND THE EU: UNEASY RELATIONS: A LOOK FROM BELGIUM 190, 194 (Nina Belyaeva 
ed., 2010). As Maria Shabanova noted in her article: 
[C]reating a negative image of “the other” is a powerful method of consolidation . . . . 
LGBT people are an easy target as 70–80% of the Russian population expresses negative 
attitudes towards gays, lesbians, bisexuals or transsexuals. Stigmatization of this group 
also goes well with anti-Western rhetoric, with homosexuality being portrayed as a 
“Western vice” designed to corrupt the Russian population and its values. 
Id. 
 231. Leonid Grigoriev, Elites: The Choice for Modernization, in RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGES 
OF TRANSFORMATION 191, 204–05 (Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri Trenin eds., 2011); Andrew C. 
Kuchins, The Obama Administration’s “Reset Button” for Russia, in RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGES 
OF TRANSFORMATION, supra, at 323, 335–36. 
 232. Other scholars have noted the confluence of authoritarianism and populism in Russia. 
See, e.g., Richard Sakwa, The Dual State in Russia, 26 POST-SOVIET AFF., no. 3, 2010, at 185, 
187. 
 233. Craig Calhoun, Foreword to RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION, supra 
note 231, at xi, xi–xii (“The Russian state is beleagured by its own transitional problems but has 
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nationalism, but there is little doubt that most share a commitment to economic development led 
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are not Great Russian, Orthodox, and/or Slavs.234 Thus, though Putin’s 
ideology definitely secures Putin’s reelection, it is an inadequate base for 
global influence. Why would a Hindu nationalist or an Indian secular liberal 
see Great Russian corporate orthodoxy as at all relevant to his or her own 
living conditions or struggles? They would not. 
As well as lacking global appeal, the ideology of Great Russian corporate 
orthodoxy does not address Russia’s problems with economic and political 
corruption235 and the absence of the rule of law. “Vertical hierarchy,” i.e., 
personal rule, which Putin sought to restore,236 is the opposite of the rule of 
law. In a rule of law state, the law is an objective, unbiased foreseeable 
prediction of what legal consequences are entailed by a given set of facts.237 
“Vertical hierarchy” has greater legal uncertainty and thus increased 
transaction costs as compared with a rule of law state, resulting in suboptimal 
economic performance. “Vertical hierarchy” and corruption also lead to low 
protection of basic human rights238 and repel significant foreign capital 
investments.239 Why invest240 in Russia if you need to pay for a “крыша,” 
bribe the police,241 and face confiscation through tax penalties242 or strict 
selective enforcement of ambiguous laws?243 In practice, foreign investors in 
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Russia soon discover that between private244 and official corruption their 
investment was unwisely made.245 These facts lead to a lack of foreign 
investment, which limits the economic growth of the Russian federation. Great 
Russian corporate Orthodoxy is sufficient for self-preservation but inadequate 
for growth, let alone global dominance. 
c. Corporatism 
The corporatist element of Great Russian Orthodox corporatism is the most 
complex and must be further exposed so that the reader can understand 
whether and to what extent Russia today is an example of state capitalism or a 
semi-planned economy. Putinism, like Peronism,246 is a form of corporatism.247 
Corporatism is the idea that labor and capital, rather than being locked into a 
zero-sum competition, can and should relate to each other cooperatively,248 and 
that the role of the state is to mediate conflicts between labor and capital to 
obtain the greatest social well-being, however defined (usually, by 
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of informal practices from taking vendors’ kickbacks to appropriating company assets for 
personal use.”). 
 245. Ledeneva and Shekshnia, in discussing these problems, state: 
In a study of Swedish companies in Russia, analysts identify three modes of market entry 
for foreign companies: export, joint venture, and direct investment; as well as three stages 
at which anti-corruption strategies are formed: planning, implementation and operations. 
They found that Swedish companies operating in Russia attributed little importance to the 
issue of corruption during the planning stage. However, many of these firms did 
encounter corruption at later stages of market penetration, and were forced to rethink their 
strategies accordingly. According to the survey presented in the paper, 25% of 
respondents said that they had encountered corruption during implementation, and 42% 
said that they had encountered it during operation. The authors concluded that corruption 
is regarded as an important obstacle for conducting business by Swedish companies 
operating in Russia, and affects these companies’ strategies to a great extent. 
Id. at 10. 
 246. James P. Brennan, Introduction to PERONISM AND ARGENTINA, at ix, ix (James P. 
Brennan ed., 1998). 
 247. SAKWA, supra note 229. 
 248. See, e.g., Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Corporatism and the Questions of the State, in 
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utilitarianism) to build the national economy.249 According to corporatism, 
economic activity should be organized into social bodies, such as trade unions, 
confederations of artisans, merchant associations, and companies.250 The 
formation of peak associations (grouping of these groups) enables each peak 
association to clearly articulate the precise goals of its group, which the state 
then mediates in the best interests of all.251 Corporatism seeks to end labor-
capital strife by creating a more secure economic system for all.252 
Corporatism is associated with a semi-planned economy and state 
capitalism,253 both of which can be seen as features of the contemporary 
Russian economy, and is coherent with Keynesianism.254 However, caveat 
lector, Keynesianism in the West failed to end the recessions of 1974 and 
1979–1982255 and would be no viable path for Russia to take for that reason. 
Corporatism is adapted to the pre-globalization world of autarchic national 
economies and is thereby involuted. No matter how much justice it may seek 
regarding the cancellation of usurious debts256 and labor organization,257 an 
involuted return to the pre-war world of isolated national economies and 
protectionism cannot meet the challenges or seize the opportunities of 
globalization and reverts to a world where there is a real risk of war for access 
to markets and resources. 
Corporatism tends to be associated with the idea of the autarchic national 
economy258 and a union of state and economy, because corporatism developed 
prior to globalization, i.e., when the world was still organized into autarchic 
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national economies rather than a world-market.259 Peronism260 in Argentina is 
currently the clearest contemporary example of corporatism.261 Russia262 and 
Singapore263 are also examples of current corporatist states. Germany and 
France historically were somewhat corporatist from the 1950s to the 1990s, 
featuring strong labor unions and other peak associations, including 
universities, broadcasting companies, and churches, as quasi-state 
institutions.264 However, Franco-German corporatism is less evident in recent 
decades. Corporatism is often, though not always, linked to religion265 and thus 
to religious concepts such as subsidiarity,266 the idea that local rule is best 
whenever possible and that the central authority must act only when no other 
better regional or local means can be found.267 Corporatism is also often 
expressed as a third way alternative between capitalism and communism.268 
Contemporary corporatism should be distinguished from historical 
corporatism.269 Contemporary corporatists recognize that we now live in an 
interdependent world and that interdependence creates conditions of peace and 
prosperity for all.270 Thus, contemporary corporatists, unlike earlier 
corporatists, do not seek to build autarchic national economies or consider 
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themselves as functioning within an isolated autarchic national economy.271 
Autarchic national economies haven’t existed in decades because autarchic 
national economies are poorer than networked interdependent specialized 
trading economies, and because economic isolation leads to conflicts over 
access to resources and markets. Increased productivity resulting from trade 
and specialization explain why economic interdependence leads to prosperity. 
Furthermore, economic interdependence discourages war.272 As a consequence 
of interdependence through trade, the global “core” (first world, the developed 
countries) no longer suffers from recurrent wars for market share and territory. 
Territory has become much less relevant due to changes in production and 
because market share is no longer linked to a national (monopolistic and 
territorial) economic order. Seeing these realities, Putin seeks to implement a 
free trading economy (Eurasian Economic Union), inasmuch as that is coherent 
with his consolidation and concentration of political power, e.g. by way of 
corporatism. 
d. Clash of Civilizations 
Putin has clearly taken up the logic that the world is a “Clash of 
Civilizations.”273 The clash of civilizations rhetoric unites Russians internally 
and expresses Russian ambitions on the world stage; its more helpful variant 
focuses on the idea of civilizational dialogue274 rather than civilizational 
conflicts. This logic of civilizations in conflict manifests in differences 
between concepts of law and human rights in Russian law and Western law 
and expresses itself through an authoritarian governance structure known as 
“vertical hierarchy.”275 Putin is currently consolidating and concentrating 
political power in his own hands and in his party, United Russia. 
Authoritarianism and centralization of formal power are, of course, 
characteristics of the USSR; however, there are at least as many divergences in 
the Russian Federation from the USSR as parallels and continuities.276 Aspects 
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of this (supposed) “clash of civilizations” will be discussed in the next section 
as they manifest in various aspects of the consolidation of power. 
2. Authoritarianism: “Vertical Hierarchy” 
Personal power and the command theory of law is still the governance 
style in post-Soviet Russia because the rule of law concept is not recognized or 
taken seriously there.277 Consequently, Putin expresses political power through 
a governance model known as “vertical hierarchy”:278 populist 
authoritarianism resting on a mass base of genuine support, or at least 
acquiescence, of a majority of Russian people.279 Authoritarianism was also 
the Soviet model of governance. However, the presence of genuine support 
through democratic legitimation distinguishes Putin’s authoritarianism from 
the Soviet dictatorship and makes the Putin regime stable. Thus, U.S. and E.U. 
concern with democracy,280 the rule of law,281 and human rights282 in Russia is 
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somewhat miscast. Russia is a democracy—an authoritarian democracy283—
with weak rule of law, and its own construction of “human rights.” The 
authoritarian regime however is rigid and suffers from systemic corruption 
which weakens the state through inefficiency and inflexibility: “The paradox 
of Russian politics is that of a strong power based on a weak state,”284 i.e. an 
inflexible corrupt state, which claims authoritarian power over its subjects. 
a. The Concept of Law 
Soviet285 and Russian law are both essentially based on a command theory 
of law:286 law as lex (zakon), a clear command of the sovereign, rather than an 
objective unbiased objective neutral principle serving justice.287 Aristotle 
appears to be the earliest source of the ideas of the rule of law as a rational 
principle288 and the idea of democracy as alternating rule between factions of 
the ruling class.289 The idea of the rule of law as an objective standard in which 
transactions have predictable outcomes (foreseeability) is strikingly absent in 
Russian and Soviet law, despite a common Greek and Russian Orthodoxy. The 
Germanic idea of justice through law is likewise absent in Russian thinking. 
Law and justice are two different words with no necessary connection in 
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Russian legal consciousness.290 At best, law in the Russian view is norms and 
commands, not a predictable structure for transparent governance with a 
serious divergence between “law in the books” and actual social practices.291 
The law-as-command theory took deeper root in Russia than the rule of 
law as a rational, neutral, objective principle because Russia has had a history 
of autocracy, dictatorship, and authoritarianism in response to the constant 
invasions from which Russia has suffered. Consequently, the Russian people 
want a strong authoritarian state that is able to resist foreign predation.292 Thus, 
the rule of law in Russia, essentially absent in the Soviet era,293 remains weak 
in contemporary Russia. “Property rights are not guaranteed and can easily be 
violated via the corrupt police, courts and other government agencies. As a 
result, free markets cannot function and the best competitor is not the most 
efficient but the one with the best connections.”294 Again, to underscore the 
economic consequences of lawlessness: Does Crimean real estate look like a 
great bargain? No. Selective taxation, uncertain legality as to the title to such 
property, and undercompensated eminent domain are examples of the things 
which await foreign investors in Russian real estate. Legal uncertainty and 
corruption lead to sub-optimal economic performance295 and poor protection of 
human rights: “declining state capacity, fiscal austerity, and growing social 
inequality, characteristic features of many of the new democracies, translate 
into gross violations of the rights of socially vulnerable groups.”296 Legal 
certainty through the rule of law would result in economic growth through 
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increased investment and trade, leading to effective human rights protection297 
and attainment.298 
In other words, there are several problems with the command theory of law 
(CTL). CTL is uncertain and unpredictable. It is impossible to know with 
certainty what the sovereign will decide or how the sovereign will decide. This 
makes CTL appear to be arbitrary and unfair. Since decision making is not 
transparent or predictable, the losing party to any outcome will be much less 
likely to accept the decision of the sovereign as legitimate. Furthermore, this 
lack of transparency and objectivity may justifiably lead one to conclude that 
the CTL sovereign’s decisions are personal, based on family, clan, or bribery, 
rather than unbiased or objective, which again makes outcomes less likely to 
be accepted by losers. Moreover, lack of transparency in the CTL can cause or 
foster corruption. Another problem with CTL is error: What happens when the 
sovereign’s decision is wrong? The CTL is simple: everyone knows what the 
command is, but it is also simplistic, opaque, and unpredictable and thus does 
not create conditions which enable economic prosperity. For all these reasons, 
Putin’s model of governance through vertical hierarchy is, no matter how 
much intelligence, finesse, or good intentions Putin personally has, simply less 
efficient than the Aristotelian rule of law concept that took root by way of 
Lockean and Kantean liberalism. 
If the rule of law state is the answer to the problems of CTL, we must look 
briefly at the concept of the rule of law state. Often, Eastern European jurists 
are uncertain about what is meant by “rule of law,” or why and how to attain it. 
In a rule of law state, the law is an objective neutral means to the goal of 
justice; the rules are the same for everyone, and the rules operate in foreseeable 
and predictable ways.299 Another feature of the rule of law state is transparent 
governance: people know who makes decisions and how they make them and 
have an opportunity for notice of legal hearings and to a hearing of their 
claims.300 The rule of law thus generates the best decisions and attracts 
voluntary compliance of the governed. In a rule of law state, laws must be 
definite and certain, not vague or ambiguous, so people can foresee outcomes 
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and structure their transactions and investments according to their own desires, 
which is more efficient due to reduced conflicts and the enablement of long-
term planning.301 Transparent governance is required so that government may 
make the best decisions possible and so the people accept and comply with 
decisions that were fairly made. Compliance with legal decisions is likelier 
where the decision maker provides reasons for his or her decision. 
In a rule of law state, legislation must be an ex ante general prediction, 
publically made and published.302 Judicial decisions, unlike legislation, are ex 
post applications of specific facts in the actual case to the relevant rules that 
the legislator made.303 Similarly, in a rule of law state, parties to proceedings 
have a right to notice of the proceeding and to hearing of their argument.304 
The essence of the rule of law is the idea that public power is a public trust 
(Treuhand)305 exercised by the government on behalf of and for the benefit of 
the people. All of these ideas are basically the opposite of vertical hierarchy: 
vertical hierarchy is unpredictable and not transparent. No one knows when the 
government may decide to actually enforce a law or for what reasons. Despite 
those criticisms one must note: Russian authoritarian democracy is much more 
transparent than the Soviet party dictatorship and has greater popular 
democratic legitimation as well as greater protections of civil and political 
rights (Bürgerrechte) than the USSR. 
Another challenge facing the rule of law in Eastern Europe is that the basic 
ideas that justice can be obtained through law, and can be best obtained 
through law, are often absent there. This is because there may be no necessary 
connection between (positive) law and (natural) justice—especially under 
CTL. If there were no necessary connection between law and justice, then law 
would not necessarily be the only or best way to attain justice. Beyond this 
law-justice disconnect, Eastern Europe also faces the problem of the law-as-
norms theory versus law-as-rules theory of law. In some cultures, laws are 
more often seen as flexible norms, rather than predictable rules.306 To the view 
of law as a norm, laws are what ought to happen, but not necessarily what in 
fact happens all, or even most, of the time.307 Rule of law cultures in contrast 
foster the law-as-rules theory in order to obtain legal certainty that in turn 
reduces transaction costs, encouraging trade and attracting long-term 
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investment.308 In Russia, however, the rule of law is absent, and just one 
example of that fact is the political dependency of the prosecutors and even 
judges on the system, summarized with the rubric of “telephone justice.”309 
“Telephone justice” is the idea that the vertical powers can at any time 
intervene in the case informally to indicate to the judiciary how the case should 
be decided.310 Although the “telephone” is an anecdote, the dependency is not. 
b. Corruption 
Whether as cause or consequence of the lack of the rule of law, Russia is 
famous for endemic corruption.311 Corruption and the absence of the rule of 
law312 are partly a consequence of the absence of the rule of law during the 
Marxist era,313 and partly a result of the chaotic privatization process in the 
1990s marked by kleptocracy, which limited economic development.314 
However, corruption in Russia can also be seen as a governance strategy. 
i. Corruption as a Governance Strategy 
By keeping all businesses in a state of semi-illegality, the Russian 
government can crack down on any business, any time.315 The illegality is 
obtained through dodgy documents (permits, licenses, visas, tax forms) which 
are not entirely correctly drawn up, tax breaks which are not quite correct and 
in order, improper visas for foreign workers,316 or no papers at all for 
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 312. Russia Has Yet to Improve Rule of Law: Deputy PM Shuvalov, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2013, 
1:51 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/23/uk-russia-economy-idUKBRE9BM0GF20131 
223. 
 313. Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of 
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 634–35 (1990). 
 314. MENDRAS, supra note 277, at 284 (“The primitive aspects of the state and the predatory 
behaviour of its leaders will inevitably operate as an impediment to economic and social 
dynamism . . . .”). 
 315. See Melik, supra note 202 (“Dozens of entrepreneurs are in prison on charges trumped 
up by officials trying to get their hands on their companies . . . .”). 
 316. See, e.g., Sean Michaels, Madonna and Lady Gaga Accused of Breaking Russian Visa 
Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2013, 7:21 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/aug/ 
02/madonna-lady-gaga-russian-visa. 
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undocumented migrant laborers,317 as well as ambiguities in the law.318 These 
public law aspects of economic corruption are matched by private practices of 
corruption such as keeping two sets of accounts (real and official)319 as well as 
the entire shadow economy (pilfering, bribery, barter of influence, drugs, 
prostitution, and illegal laborers from the Caucuses or China).320 All of these 
instruments of corruption enable the Russian government to legally shut 
down—or shake down321—any business at any time, as can be seen from the 
Yukos affair322 or in Madonna’s performance visa.323 At the same time, 
however, notice that these instruments are all financial corruption, not blood 
crimes.324 The blood crime era of the 1990s325 is mostly over,326 and even 
“mere” extortion has been waning for some years.327 Despite the murders of 
many journalists,328 murder is less and less a governance tactic in Russia. The 
 
 317. Tom Kelly, Spread-Eagled Against the Wall and Marched off Single-File: How Russia 
Deals with Illegal Immigrants, MAIL ONLINE (July 31, 2013, 7:52 PM), http://www.dailymail.co. 
uk/news/article-2381878/How-Russia-deals-illegal-immigrants.html. 
 318. See, e.g., Amiel Ungar, New Law Would Demonize Foreign Funded Russian NGOs, 
ARUTZ SHEVA (July 3, 2012, 4:40 AM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/ 
157437#.Uw8D4dyrVGI. 
 319. LEDENEVA, supra note 243, at 142–64. 
 320. Id. at 115–41. 
 321. As reported last year: 
One such case was that of oil giant Yukos, which was privatized in 1996 and later accused 
of tax evasion in 2004. The company’s chief executive, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was 
convicted of fraud and jailed. The Russian state then bought the company and its assets at 
a knock-down price, prompting widespread accusations that the charges were politically 
motivated. 
Holly Ellyatt, Is Russia Too Corrupt for International Business?, CNBC (June 11, 2013, 5:30 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100805382. 
 322. Yukos Executive Khodorkovsky Charged with Fraud, Tax Evasion, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
26, 2003), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acD4lsuFwPy4. 
 323. Michaels, supra note 316. 
 324. LEDENEVA, supra note 243, at 11 (“[O]rganized crime seems to be on the retreat . . . .”). 
 325. See DAVID M.  KOTZ & FRED WEIR, RUSSIA’S PATH FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN: THE 
DEMISE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE NEW RUSSIA 267 (2007). 
 326. But see Melik, supra note 202 (“The case of Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer employed by 
a western investment fund, who exposed corruption and then found himself thrown in prison by 
the very people he had accused, and who then died in prison, has served as a dire warning to all 
potential investors.”). 
 327. Ledeneva & Shekshnia, supra note 244, at 13 (“[T]he level of direct extortion attempts 
by organized criminal groups in such countries as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus has declined 
significantly since 2000. Yet, government officials at all levels have increased pressure for 
economic gains and many former mafia figureheads have entered political life. Another tendency 
is that lump sum corruption has given way to more sophisticated, legalized forms of income such 
as shares in business and other forms of long-term participation.”). 
 328. See 56 Journalists Murdered in Russia Since 1992, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS, https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
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fact that Putin instilled at least basic order creating conditions for economic 
growth329 and increased average life expectancy and population growth 
explains why he maintains majority support, despite suppression of political 
and personal freedom and despite the system of corruption as a governance 
tactic.330 The problem is that these mechanisms of governance repel foreign 
investors because corruption threatens the security of economic relations.331 
Lack of foreign investment in turn leads to suboptimal market performance.332 
Cold weather is not the only reason Siberia’s vast mineral resources still 
remain largely underground. While vertical hierarchy might be justified as 
having been necessary to end the era of criminality that was the 1990s, it limits 
Russia’s industrialization by repelling foreign investors. Russia, unlike the 
USSR, does not seek autarchy and even desires foreign investment333 and 
foreign trade. Thus, instituting the rule of law is both in the interest of the 
Russian people and of the Russian government. The West is neither able nor 
planning to overthrow Putin, and Putin should consider his own eventual 
succession since the system in place would probably collapse into mafia wars 
between rival clans if he were to die. 
Corruption as governance strategy also includes corruption of the electoral 
process,334 whether by crude voting fraud, smearing reputations (kompromat), 
 
 329. Alexander Rahr & Nicolai N. Petro, Our Man in Moscow, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 
Summer 2005, at 5, 6. 
 330. Interview: How Russiaʼs ‘Sistema’ Leads to the ‘Modernization Trap,’ RADIO FREE 
EUR. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/interview-russia-alena-ledeneva-sistema/24944 
910.html [hereinafter Interview] (“The people’s view—I suppose they might be criticizing 
sistema, but they also assume its legitimacy in some way. And that is why, once Putin brought 
that order to the system, he has been supported. He is still supported for that because you could 
see that what he is getting or what his government is getting is trickling down in ways that are 
understandable to people. That’s why 62 percent vote for Putin, even for a third term, even if that 
negates the [spirit of the] constitution (i.e., the Russian Constitution limits presidents to two 
consecutive terms).”). 
 331. European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on 
Combating Organized Crime, 2000 O.J. (C 106) 5, 7. 
 332. Melik, supra note 202 (“According to Angus Roxburgh, former BBC Moscow 
correspondent and later a public-relations adviser to the Kremlin, there is one overriding reason 
why Russia is failing to achieve its economic potential and failing to attract outside investors: 
corruption.”). 
 333. Igor Dunayevsky, Russia Waiting for U.S. Investors, RUSS. BEYOND HEADLINES (Feb. 
27, 2014), http://rbth.ru/international/2014/02/27/russia_waiting_for_us_investors_34593.html. 
 334. As Wilson notes: 
The post-Soviet states still practice forms of political manipulation that are more radical, 
more pervasive and more corrosive of real democracy than anything attempted by spin-
doctors or K-Street consultants in the west. And they are still preferred to, though often 
combined with, cruder and more obviously authoritarian methods. The corruption of the 
political process is as important as the falsification of election results. 
Wilson, supra note 223. 
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political extortion335 or more subtle manipulative campaigning336 and 
information warfare (disinformation, maskirovka), and various dissimulation 
strategies frequently described as “post-modern.”337 These governance 
technologies338 appear to be extensions and refinements of Soviet era 
practices339 made famous by the KGB.340 In Russia today the dual regime of 
state-and-party that characterized the Soviet era is replicated,341 somewhat, 
with United Russia playing a role similar to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. However, the system (sistema) is not merely a shadow state-within-a-
state.342 The system is also a complex network of interactions between 
different groups and individuals,343 which limits the ability of all actors to push 
“too far” due to uncertainty as to the rules of the game. The system is sub-
optimal but sufficiently adaptive to survive and even create rudimentary 
prosperity, at least so far, which assures its popularity.344 
 
 335. LEDENEVA, supra note 243, at 58–90. 
 336. Id. at 28–57. 
 337. WILSON, supra note 159, at 8 (“The denial of truth in the Soviet Union throughout most 
of the twentieth century created many of the preconditions for virtuality in the twenty-first.ˮ). 
 338. Id. at 29 (“As was traditional in the 1970s, the tactics adopted by the local KGB and 
Party Central Committee were open and crude to a degree that would have been unacceptable in 
Moscow. Divide-and-rule tactics and active measures to discredit the opposition scored some 
successes, while attempts to set up fake oppositions and support groups often fell at the first 
hurdle.”). 
 339. Id. at 33 (“Many of the active measures developed in the Soviet and even tsarist eras 
have been redesigned for contemporary use . . . .ˮ). 
 340. Id. at 10–11. 
 341. According to Sakwa: 
There is a process of ‘dual adaptation’ in Russian politics, reflecting the bifurcated nature 
of the system in its entirety. . . . On the one hand, elections are held . . . . On the other 
hand, a parallel para-constitutional system operates, in which the regime imposes its 
preferences and where factions seek to influence outcomes through a closed and shadow 
political system. The most successful actors are those who can operate successfully at 
both levels. 
SAKWA, supra note 279, at 3. 
 342. See id. at viii (“[A] dual state has emerged in which the legal-normative system based on 
constitutional order is challenged by shadowy arbitrary arrangements, dubbed in this book ‘the 
administrative regime’, populated by various conflicting factions.ˮ). 
 343. Interview, supra note 330 (“[S]istema is not something very simple. It is an outcome of 
complex, anonymous, unpredictable, seemingly irrational forces. But it also glues society 
together. It distributes resources. It mobilizes people. It contributes to stability in people’s minds. 
It ensures its own reproduction.”). 
 344. As Ledeneva explains: 
Sistema victims, as well as critics of Putin’s sistema, are emphatic about the negative 
features of his system of governance, but it is not exclusively dysfunctional. The network-
based governance is complex, diffuse, unpredictable and seemingly unmanageable, but at 
the same time it serves to glue society together, to distribute resources and to mobilize 
cadres, to contribute to both stability and change and to ensure its own reproduction. . . . 
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ii. Political Prisoners and Amnesties 
When Putin came to power, he offered other oligarchs a deal.345 They 
could either abandon politics and keep their wealth or go into exile.346 Putin’s 
imposition of order rested on a sort of amnesty. Khodorkovsky chose to 
challenge Putin and keep his wealth, and so met ten years in Siberian prison.347 
Putin ultimately amnestied his political rival Khodorkovsky.348 Likewise, Putin 
also finally amnestied his cultural rival Pussy Riot, as well as the ecological 
activists in Greenpeace—after giving them all a taste of Russian prison.349 
Amnesties and deferrals of prosecution are typical tactics used in Western 
governments to root out and purge systemic corruption.350 In Russia one might 
question whether amnesties could or should be used to root out corruption and 
build the rule of law or would instead be but one more means to consolidate 
Putin’s power or that of United Russia. In any case, political imprisonment 
with the possibility of amnesty strengthens Putin’s rule. It enables Putin to 
gently remove political opponents who are a threat as needed and then to 
present himself as gracious and merciful when the opponent is no longer a 
threat. Notice moreover that Putin did not outright kill those opponents. So 
maybe Putin351 did not kill Litvinenko,352 Magnitsky,353 or any of the dozens of 
journalists who have died in Russia in the last two decades.354 Prison with 
 
Russia cannot modernize without modernizing the network-based governace patterns 
referred to as sistema. 
LEDENEVA, supra note 290, at 2. 
 345. UK Police Probe Death of Exiled Russian Oligarch Berezovsky, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 
24, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/24/russian-oligarch-berezovsky-found-dead-
uk-police-say. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Putin ‘to Pardon’ Jailed Former Oil Tycoon Khodorkovsky, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2013, 
10:54 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25450785. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Amnestie für Pussy-Riot-Musikerinnen und Greenpeace-Aktivisten, SÜDDEUTSCHE.DE 
(Dec. 18, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/anordnung-von-putin-amnestie-
fuer-pussy-riot-musikerinnen-und-greenpeace-aktivisten-1.1846629. 
 350. See, e.g., Samuel Rubenfeld, UK to Move Forward with Deferred-Prosecution 
Agreements, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/ 
2012/10/23/uk-to-move-forward-with-deferred-prosecution-agreements. 
 351. See Duncan Gardham, Russia ‘Gave Agents Licence to Kill’ Enemies of the State, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ 
russia/8802732/Leaked-document-reveals-plans-to-eliminate-Russias-enemies-overseas.html. 
 352. Litvinenko Murder: Coroner ‘Said Russia Could Be Involved,’ BBC News (Jan. 21, 
2014, 10:55 AM) http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-25824904. 
 353. Magnitsky v. Russia, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litiga 
tion/magnitsky-v-russia (last updated Oct. 17, 2012). 
 354. See 56 Journalists Killed in Russia Since 1992, supra note 328. The most famous of the 
dozens of murdered journalists in Russia is Anna Politovskaya. See Charles Clover, Russia ‘Close 
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possible amnesty allows Putin to distance himself from cases where the 
security services or local leaders eliminate enemies permanently. 
Although Putin has developed resilient tactics and an internally coherent 
popular ideology, United Russia has yet to even develop, let alone implement, 
a concept of the rule of law as objective foreseeable measures which attain 
procedural and substantive justice in order to attract voluntary compliance and 
create legal certainty so as to encourage and attract investment. Nor has Russia 
developed a model to root out corruption. That may not entirely be the fault of 
Russia.355 
A sensible plan to purge corruption from the state would proceed step-by-
step: first purge the judiciary, then the tax service, then the military, and finally 
police corruption. An effective anti-corruption campaign would also place 
priority on blood crimes and make a clear distinction between violent crime 
and property crime. However, the more famous amnesties Putin has granted 
were personal, individual, and arbitrary rather than a part of his anti-corruption 
campaign.356 Since Putin’s amnesties were personal, individual, and politically 
arbitrary, they cannot be seen as part of the needed sustained struggle to attain 
the rule of law and transparent governance by ending corruption. 
 
to Solving Journalist’s Murder,’ FIN. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/a53c875a-ce68-11e0-b755-00144feabdc0.html. 
 355. Combatting corruption in Russia may prove more difficult than imagined: 
  The global corruption paradigm that has prevailed since the 1990s is based on three 
premises: that corruption can be defined, that corruption can be measured, and that 
measurements can be translated into specific policies. Since then, significant advances in 
corruption studies and anti-corruption policies have been made all over the world. 
However, the current paradigm and the use of the term “corruptionˮ do not facilitate an 
understanding of the workings of corruption in Russia for three reasons. 
  Firstly, corruption is an umbrella term for a variety of complex phenomena 
associated with betrayal of trust, deception, deliberate subordination of common interests 
to specific interests, secrecy, complicity, mutual obligation and camouflage of the corrupt 
act. In order to deal with such diverse practices in an effective way, we disaggregate 
“corruptionˮ into clusters of informal practices, widespread yet specific for businesses in 
Russian regions. 
  Secondly, the concept of corruption that underlies international regulatory standards 
presumes completion of the transformation from what Weber described as “patrimonial 
power structures”—where decisions made on the basis of people’s relationships and 
traditional forms of authority—to rational-legal systems, where institutionalized rules 
become the foundation of governance. . . . 
  Thirdly, majority of contemporary definitions of corruption presume that there is a 
clear distinction between public and private realms. 
Ledeneva & Shekshnia, supra note 244, at 7–8. 
 356. Indeed, a series of arrests and firings may have less to do with politics than economics. 
See Ben Aris, Putinʼs Anti-Corruption Campaign Begins to Bite, RUSS. BEYOND HEADLINES 
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://rbth.co.uk/business/2013/02/28/putins_anti-corruption_campaign_begins_ 
to_bite_23395.html. 
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In sum, Putin’s contemporary amnesties, rather than a reform to attain the 
rule of law, are part of his consolidation of political power, which by definition 
will not outlive Putin. This has long been the lament of dictatorship: the death 
of the dictator creates chaos while his successor is selected and uncertainty 
reigns.357 If Putin wishes to assure the stability of Russia after his death and 
attract western capital investments, then Putin’s Great Russian corporatist 
orthodoxy must ultimately comprehend the concept of law as an objective, 
unbiased measure serving justice and not merely as personal power or 
authoritative command. 
c. The Patriarchal Family 
When laws are weak or non-existent and you wish to build a system of 
moral governance and gain political legitimacy you must rely on other 
institutions.358 Family and religion have unquestionable legitimacy and can 
serve as moral anchors to secure state power. Thus, after the Second World 
War, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany gave special 
institutional protection to family359 and churches360 as well as to 
broadcasting361 and schools.362 These institutional guarantees were provided 
not only to prevent abuses of state power but also to rebuild state power on 
legitimate bases. In the case of Russia, a similar legitimation of state power 
through institutional guarantees of the patriarchal family363 and the Orthodox 
Church364 is clearly occurring. This reliance on Church and family as 
substitutes for the rule of law leads to various conflicts regarding basic human 
rights in Russia. The consequence of legitimating state power by reference to 
the patriarchal family and the Orthodox Church means that challenges facing 
those institutions are also indirect challenges to state power. This explains why 
the issue of LGBT rights and adoption are so contentious in Russia. 
 
 357. ARISTOTLE, supra note 289, at 120–132. 
 358. LEDENEVA, supra note 243, at 171 (“In a high-risk environment with underdeveloped 
legal institutions, which do not ensure contract enforcement and property rights, alternative forms 
of enforcement may become an integral part of the implementation of financial schemes, thus 
creating a niche for ‘progress pushers’—the enforcers of contracts, financial schemes, 
takeovers—to complement or substitute for the workings of the legal system by the use of 
informal practices.”). 
 359. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 6, at 41 (Christian 
Tomuschat & David Curry trans. 1998). 
 360. Id. art. 4, at 40–41. 
 361. Id. art. 5, at 41. 
 362. Id. art. 7, at 42. 
 363. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION art. 38, at 16 (Finnish Lawyers’ 
Publ’g 1994). 
 364. Id. art. 29, §2, at 14. 
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i. “The Family” and the Orthodox Church as Quasi-State Corporatist 
Institutions in Russia 
The purpose of “family” and the Orthodox Church as a quasi-state 
institution is to legitimate the state and provide extra-legal institutions of social 
control, due to the failure to build the rule of law in Russia. Though reliance on 
these institutions could be used as it was in Germany to rebuild state 
legitimacy and the rule of law, to present that does not appear to be the case. 
Family and the Orthodox Church as quasi-state institutions are most evidently 
in conflict with individual human rights on the issues of sexual minorities. 
Marriage may only be contracted between a man and a woman365 under 
Russian law. Same-sex domestic partnership of any kind is not recognized 
under Russian law.366 Gay marriage is seen in Russia as a Western idea367 and 
a violation of natural law368 masquerading as “human rights.”369 Likewise, in 
practice, homosexuals cannot adopt children in Russia.370 Putin claims that gay 
rights are not violated by the Russian state:371 “In the Russian Federation—so 
that it is clear to everybody—there is no infringement on the rights of sexual 
minorities. . . . These people, like everyone else, enjoy all the same rights and 
freedoms as everyone else.”372 However, laws enacted by the Russian 
Federation,373 Russia’s federal republics,374 and several Russian cities375 and 
 
 365. SEMEINYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SK RF] [THE FAMILY CODE OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION] art. 12. 
 366. Alexander Kondakov, Heteronormativity of the Russian Legal Discourse: The Silencing, 
Lack, and Absence of Homosexual Subjects in Law and Policies, 4 SORTUZ: OÑATI J. EMERGENT 
SOCIO-LEGAL STUD., no. 2, 2010 at 4, 11–12, available at http://www.sortuz.org/pdf/mayo2011/ 
kondakov.pdf. 
 367. Alexander Kondakov, Odnopolyĭ Brak v Rossii: «Temnoe Proshloe», Ser’īe Budni i 
«Svetloe» Posleėavtra [Same-Sex Marriage in Russia: Obscure Past, Dull Today, and ‘Bright’ 
Tomorrow], 20 GENDERN’ĪE ISSLEDOVANII ͡A [GENDER STUDIES] 51, 51 (2010) (Russ.), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764387. 
 368. See id. at 51–54. 
 369. See id. at 53. 
 370.  Den’ v Istorii [Day in History], GAY RUSS., http://www.gayrussia.eu/day_in_history/ 
7064 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 371. Gay Rights Not Violated in Russia—Putin, RIA NOVOSTI (Sept. 4, 2013, 1:13 PM), 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130409/180521813/Gay-Rights-Not-Violated-in-Russia---Putin.html. 
 372. Alexei Anishchuk & Thomas Escritt, Gay Rights Activists, Topless Protesters Greet 
Putin, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-russia-
germany-idUSBRE93707J20130408 (quoting Vladimir Putin). 
 373. A Russian Federation-wide ban on gay propaganda went into effect on June 30, 2013, 
following a federal law banning the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors. 
Den’ v Istorii, supra note 370. 
 374. See FAMILY & DEMOGRAPHY FOUND., COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMITTEE OF 
MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONCERNING ALEKSEYEV V. RUSSIA (APPLICATION NO. 
4916/07), at 5 n.8 (2013), available at http://en.familypolicy.ru/read/240 (“Republic of 
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regions376 restrict the rights of homosexuals377 to voice political protest378 and 
to adopt children. 
The suppression of LGBT persons’ political rights to protest379 and civil 
rights to family are supposedly justified as somehow necessary for the 
“prevention of riots and protection of health, morals and the rights and 
freedoms of others,”380 i.e. to maintain public order and/or to protect 
children381 (from what?) and foster reproduction.382 While the goals of 
 
Bashkortostan Law N 581-z, ʻOn amending the Republic of Bashkortostan law ʻOn fundamental 
safeguards of the rights of the child in the Republic of Bashkortostan’ passed July 23rd 2012.”). 
 375. Id. at 5 n.4 (“St. Petersburg Law N 108-18 ʻOn amending the St. Petersburg law ʻOn 
administrative offences in St. Petersburg’ passed by March 7th 2012”); Id. at 4 n.2 (“Archangelsk 
Regional Law N 226-24-OZ, ʻOn specific means of protection of health and morals of children in 
the Archangelsk region’ passed by September 30th 2011”); Id. at 5 n.3 (“Kostroma Regional Law 
N 193-5-ZKO, ‘On amending the Kostroma regional law ‘On safeguards of the rights of the child 
in the Kostroma region’ passed by February 15th 2012”); Id. at 5 n.9 (“Krasnodar Territory Law 
N 2535-KZ,‘On amending specific legislative acts of the Krasnodar Territory as regards the 
stepping up of the protection of health and the moral and spiritual development of children’ 
passed by July 3rd 2012”); Id. at 5 n.6 (“Magadan Regional Law N 1507-OZ, ‘On amending 
specific Magadan regional laws as regards the protection of minors from factors affecting their 
physical, intellectual, psychological, spiritual, and moral development’ passed by June 9th 
2012”); Id. at 5 n.5 (“Novosibirsk Regional Law N 226-OZ, ‘On amending specific laws of the 
Novosibirsk region’ passed by June 14th 2012”); Id. at 4 n.1 (“Ryazan Regional Law N 41-OZ, 
‘On the protection of morals of children in the Ryazan region’ passed by April 3rd 2006”); Id. at 
5 n.7 (“Samara Regional Law N 75-GD, ‘On amending the Samara regional law ‘On 
administrative offences in the Samara region’ passed by July 10th 2012”). 
 376. Kaliningrad zapryetil propagandoo pyedofilii i gomosyeksooalizma [Kaliningrad has 
banned the promotion of homosexuality and pedophilia], POLITIKUS.RU (Jan. 25, 2013, 7:08 PM), 
http://politikus.ru/events/3514-kaliningrad-zapretil-propagandu-pedofilii-i-gomoseksualiz 
ma.html. 
 377. Putin signed the law banning gay propaganda on June 29, 2013. Den’ v Istorii, supra 
note 370. 
 378. See Michael Schwirtz, Anti-Gay Law Stirs Fears in Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/anti-gay-law-stirs-fears-in-russia.html?_r=3&. 
 379. See Kondakov, supra note 366, at 7. 
 380. Kristen L. Thomas, Note, We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used to It: Freedom of 
Assembly and Gay Pride in Alekseyev v. Russia, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 473, 476 (2012). 
 381. Paul Johnson, ‘Homosexual Propaganda’ Laws in the Russian Federation: Are They in 
Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights? 8 (July 8, 2013) (working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2251005. 
 382. As Putin stated: 
  I’ve tried to answer similar questions before. There is a rather acute demographic 
problem in Russia, as in the rest of Europe. We are making serious efforts to improve the 
situation, and we are having success. I think we have the best indicators in Europe in 
terms of the rate of improvement. For the first time in the last 10 to 15 years, we are 
seeing a sustainable trend of rising births, and the country’s population has even increased 
somewhat this year. 
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protecting people from riots and fostering reproduction are desirable, the 
means the Russian Federation has chosen to those ends are inapt. 
Contraception remains legal in Russia, for example.383 Although it is 
questionable whether suppression of homosexuality is even possible, let alone 
whether that would somehow contribute to protecting or preserving the family 
or increased reproduction, the suppression of LGBT rights in Russia shores up 
the domestic legitimacy of Putin and United Russia.384 It invokes Great 
Russian nationalism and the Orthodox Church385 to rally a majority of Russian 
people around Putin and United Russia in order to forestall any U.S. effort to 
instigate a “color revolution.”386 However, the Russian government’s policy of 
ignorance and suppression in fact has deadly consequences. There are several 
documented cases of hate crimes against LGBT individuals and groups in 
 
  As for same-sex marriages, they do not produce offspring, as you know. So we are 
fairly tolerant toward sexual minorities, however we think that the state should promote 
reproduction, support mothers and children, and look after their health. 
Transcript of Vladimir Putin’s Interview with CNN’s Larry King, RIA NOVOSTI (Feb. 12, 2010, 
8:00 AM), http://en.rian.ru/interview/20101202/161586625.html. 
 383. Chloe Arnold, Abortion Remains Top Birth-Control Option in Russia, RADIO FREE EUR. 
RADIO LIBERTY (June 28, 2008), http://www.rferl.org/content/Abortion_Remains_Top_Birth_ 
Control_Option_Russia/1145849.html. 
 384. According to Maria Shabanova: 
[C]reating a negative image of “the other” is a powerful method of consolidation . . . . 
LGBT people are an easy target as 70-80% of the Russian population expresses negative 
attitudes towards gays, lesbians, bisexuals or transsexuals. Stigmatization of this group 
also goes well with anti-Western rhetoric, with homosexuality being portrayed as a 
“Western vice” designed to corrupt the Russian population and its values. 
Shabanova, supra note 230. 
 385. See Thomas Grove & Steve Gutterman, Russia’s Gays Fear More Violence After Brutal 
Murder, REUTERS (May 13, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/13/us-
russia-gay-idUSBRE94C0AX20130513 (“President Vladimir Putin has also overseen a religious 
revival that aims to give the Orthodox Church, whose leader has suggested that homosexuality is 
one of the main threats to Russia, a more public role as a moral authority. The number of 
documented cases of violence against gays in Russia is low. But there are no official figures on 
anti-gay crime in Russia, and gay rights campaigners say the numbers available mask the true 
number of attacks on gays, lesbians, bisexual and transgender people. Most go unreported, or are 
not classified as such by the police.”). 
 386. Russia Moves to Enact Anti-Gay Law Nationwide, DAILY HERALD (Jan. 21, 2013, 10:19 
AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20130121/news/701219861/ (“The legislation being 
pushed by the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church would make it illegal nationwide to 
provide minors with information that is defined as ‘propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, 
bisexuality and transgenderism.’ It includes a ban on holding public events that promote gay 
rights. . . . The bill is part of an effort to promote traditional Russian values as opposed to 
Western liberalism, which the Kremlin and church see as corrupting Russian youth and by 
extension contributing to a wave of protest against President Vladimir Putin’s rule.”). 
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Russia,387 including Russian homosexuals who were murdered simply for 
being gay.388 
ii. “The Family” as a Quasi-State Institution: Inter-Country Adoption 
To further defend the patriarchal family and to express Russian grievances 
against the United States, Putin restricted foreign adoption of Russian children, 
first to the United States,389 then to those countries that recognize same sex 
marriage.390 These policies, though terrible for children, are politically popular 
in Russia. 
The Russian government regards its views on gay rights and inter-country 
adoption, as well as its invasion and occupation of Georgia and Crimea, as 
somehow legal under international law. Although it is clear that Russia’s laws 
against gay propaganda are violations of Russia’s treaty obligations under the 
European Convention of Human Rights391 and that its interventions in Georgia 
and Crimea are also illegal,392 Russia has a much better case that it can prohibit 
foreign adoption of Russian children without violating Russia’s treaty 
obligations. Russia393 is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Inter-
Country Adoption,394 which holds that children should have families395 and 
 
 387. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RUSSIA 
83–85 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160474.pdf. 
 388. See Grove & Gutterman, supra note 385 (“They beat him. They shoved beer bottles in 
his anus. They tried to set him on fire. Then they crushed his head with a heavy stone. A 23-year-
old man in Russia’s southern city of Volgograd was tortured and killed after revealing he was gay 
during a drinking session last Thursday night, investigators said, taking a rare step by linking a 
murder to homophobia.”). 
 389. Kirit Radia, Russian Lawmakers Pass Ban on Adoptions to U.S., ABC NEWS (Dec. 26, 
2012, 8:22 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/12/russian-lawmakers-pass-ban-on 
-adoptions-to-us/. 
 390. Russia Bans Adoptions from Countries that Allow Gay Marriage, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 
13, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10635821/ 
Russia-bans-adoptions-from-countries-that-allow-gay-marriage.html. 
 391. See Thomas, supra note 380, at 485; Paul Johnson, Russian Ban on Homosexual 
Propaganda Violates Human Rights, JURIST (Dec. 1, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/ 
2011/12/paul-johnson-russia-lgbt.php. 
 392. James Joyner, EU: Georgia ‘Triggered’ Russia’s Illegal Invasion, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
(Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/eu-georgia-triggered-
russias-illegal-invasion; UN: Russia’s Annexation of Crimea is Illegal, N.Y. POST (Mar. 27, 2014, 
12:36 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/27/un-russias-annexation-of-crimea-is-illegal/. 
 393. Convention Countries, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, http://adoption.state.gov/hague_con 
vention/countries.php (last updated Aug. 2013). 
 394. Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167. 
 395. Id. (“Recognising that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding.”). 
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establishes minimum standards and harmonizes procedures for the adoption of 
children throughout the world.396 Although Russia has signed the Convention 
of the Rights of the Child (CRC),397 the CRC does not oblige Russia to allow 
inter-country adoption, let alone adoption to sexual minorities. Article 21(b) of 
the CRC states: “[I]nter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative 
means of [a] child’s care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an 
adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s 
country of origin.”398 The treaty says “may” not “must.” The CRC centers 
children’s rights on the “best interests of the child,” referencing the concept in 
articles 9, 18, 20, 21, 37, and 40.399 The Russian government can well argue 
that the best interests of Russian children are to remain in the Russian language 
area, or even to be raised by heterosexual adoptive parents because the best 
interests standard is very vague. Are “best interests” defined culturally, 
materially, legally, or politically?400 The CRC does not answer that question401 
because the “best interests” standard is inadequately defined in the treaty 
itself.402 The “best interests of the child” principle enables “governments to 
hide behind the veil of culture and avoid addressing human rights abuses of 
children in their countries.”403 Although “[i]t should be the goal of the 
international community to ensure that intercountry adoption is considered as a 
viable alternative in deciding the best interests of the world’s children,”404 the 
Russian government is under no international legal obligation to permit 
adoption of Russian children to foreign countries or to same sex couples. 
d. Civil and Political Rights (Bürgerrechte) 
Putin’s consolidation and concentration of political power also means 
suppression of formal freedoms and domestic dissent. Although the Russian 
 
 396. Id. 
 397. Boris Dittrich, Who Speaks for Russia’s Children?, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jan. 27, 
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/27/who-speaks-russias-children; Peter Roudik, 
Children’s Rights: Russian Federation, L. LIB. CONG., http://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/ 
russia.php (last updated Sept. 16, 2014) (“The Federal Law on Basic Guarantees of the Rights of 
the Child in the Russian Federation of July 21, 1998 repeats all the provisions of the CRC.”). 
 398. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 21(b), adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added). 
 399. Id. at arts. 9, 18, 20, 21, 37 & 40. 
 400. Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 173 
(1998). 
 401. See id. at 172–73. 
 402. Id. at 173. 
 403. Id. at 175. 
 404. Linda J. Olsen, Comment, Live or Let Die: Could Intercountry Adoption Make The 
Difference?, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 487 (2004). 
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constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech,405 peaceful public 
assembly,406 and to freedom of association,407 fundamental rights under the 
Russian constitution may be limited by ordinary federal legislation where such 
legislation is necessary to protect the constitutional system, morality, health, 
and national security.408 These exceptions are broad enough to enable the 
Russian government to suppress political expression. General clauses409 and 
“gaps in current Russian legislation . . . are misused to allow and justify 
discrimination.”410 The freedoms of assembly411 and of speech412 are also 
suppressed by imposing substantial413 fines,414 supposedly justified by the 
paranoid neo-Stalinist excuse of “foreign agents,”415 by vigilante attacks,416 or 
 
 405. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 29(1) (Russ.) 
(“Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.”). 
 406. Id. at art. 31 (“Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble 
peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, mass meetings and demonstrations, marches and 
pickets.”). 
 407. Id. at art. 30(1) (“Everyone shall have the right of association, including the right to 
establish trade unions for the protection of his (her) interests. The freedom of activity of public 
associations shall be guaranteed.”). 
 408. Id. at art. 55(3) (“Human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law 
only to the extent necessary for the protection of the basis of the constitutional order, morality, 
health, rights and lawful interests of other people, and for ensuring the defence of the country and 
the security of the State.”). 
 409. Shabanova, supra note 230, at 192–93. 
 410. Id. at 190. 
 411. See, e.g., Gay Pride Parade Banned for 100 Years in Russia, HUMAN RTS. FIRST (June  
7, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/06/07/gay-pride-parade-banned-for-100-years-in-
russia/. 
 412. Eugene Feldman, “Homophobia—the Religion of Cattle”: the Red Square Were LGBT 
Activists, NOVOYA GAZETA (July 14, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/724 
07.html. 
 413. Another Saint Petersburg LGBT Agency Fined Half a Million, RAINBOW NEWS (June 
19, 2013), http://english.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2013/06/19-26378.htm. After the film festival 
“Side by Side,” the St. Petersburg LGBT NGO “Vikhod” (Exit, i.e. coming out) was fined 
500,000 rubles (€11,600). Id. 
 414. Zoornalistka “Novoy gazyeti” Yelyena Kostyochyenko oshtrafovana soodom na 20,000 
rooblyey za uchastiye v Moskovskom gyey-praydye [Novoya Gazeta Journalist, Elena 
Kostyuchenko, fined 20,000 rubles by Moscow Court for participating in the city’s Gay Pride 
Parade], GAY RUSS. (July 11, 2013), http://www.gayrussia.eu/russia/7124/. 
 415. Head of “Coming Out” Fined For 300 Thousand as “a Foreign Agent,” RAINBOW 
NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://english.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2013/06/27-26412.htm (“A court 
hearing of the case accusing the head of the ‘Coming Out’ Russian LGBT Organization in 
breaching of the law on ‘foreign agents’ took place on June 25. The judge Politova declared Anna 
Anisimova (director in charge of the LGBT organization) guilty and issued a fine in the sum of 
300 thousand rubles (€7,000). A week earlier this entity was also declared guilty and obliged to 
pay 0.5 mln rubles (€11,700) in fines.”). 
 416. Thomas, supra note 380, at 478–79. 
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police abuse.417 Some freedom of speech is tolerated in order to identify 
potential opponents and then discredit or co-opt them, which also was the 
tactic unsuccessfully tried by Gorbachev to create “a tame opposition.”418 
Whether despite or because of these measures and their flexibility, Putin is 
genuinely popular. This is because whether looking at income,419 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 417. Alexander Tikhomirov, Moscow Gay Pride Protests Blocked by Russia Police, WORLD 
POST (May 27, 2012, 9:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/27/moscow-gay-pride-
protests_n_1548992.html. 
 418. WILSON, supra note 159, at 22. 
 419. Yakunin, supra note 274, at 455. 
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life expectancy,420 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or population.421 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 420. Russian Male and Female Life Expectancy, ACADEMIC.RU, http://academic.ru/pictures/ 
wiki/files/82/Russian_male_and_female_life_expectancy.PNG (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 421. Yakunin, supra note 274, at 454. 
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Russia is better off under Putin than under Yeltsin. 
e. Human Rights 
Human rights in Western Europe and the United States are generally better 
protected than in Russia in part due to a poorer economy and the absence of the 
rule of law. Prisoners, conscripts, undocumented workers, and homosexuals 
are regularly abused in Russia, and political protest is often silenced.422 The 
Russian ombudsman for human rights is well aware of such abuses,423 and 
naturally wishes to improve human rights protection in Russia.424 However, 
 
 422. See Alexander Kondakov, Same-Sex Marriages Inside the Closet: Deconstruction of 
Subjects of Gay and Lesbian Discourses in Russia, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, no. 1, 2011, at 
1, 4. 
 423. Russian Ombudsman: Gay Hate Law “May Lead to Human Losses and Tragedies,” 
RAINBOW NEWS (June 12, 2013), http://english.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2013/06/12-26356.htm 
(“Vladimir Lukin, the Russian Ombudsman, believes that the gay hate law which was approved 
yesterday by the State Duma ‘may have the high price to be paid for and may cause human 
tragedies.’” (quoting Vladimir Lukin)). 
 424. Kondavok, supra note 422 (“In the early summer 2010 the Russian ombudsman 
introduced his report about situation with human rights in Russia to the public (The 
Ombudsman’s Report 2009, 2010). The report carefully covered a wide range of issues 
concerning claims to respect for human rights from different groups of Russian citizens: 
Prisoners, military servants, immigrants. Discursively the report contributes to the established 
practice of political talk in Russia: There are things one can say something about (especially 
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Putin’s consolidation of political power and maintenance of public order often 
seriously infringe on human rights in Russia. 
The lack of a rule of law state, evident in the problem of judicial 
subordination to vertical power,425 is a serious problem for Russia, not only in 
human terms but also in economic and political terms. Foreign investment is 
repelled by lawlessness, hampering Russia’s domestic economy.426 The 
absence of the rule of law and the prevalence of human rights abuse in Russia 
result in less foreign investment, leading to suboptimal economic performance 
and emigration (“brain drain”), a vicious downward spiral.427 Trade and 
investment lead to prosperity, resulting in better protection of human rights.428 
Increasing trade and investment also creates conditions under which the rule of 
law is likely to be increasingly respected for the following reasons: 1) 
increasing wealth reduces the relative incentive for law breaking (why break 
the law when you can get what you want legally?); 2) foreign investors do not 
wish to see their economic interests nationalized and thus press for functioning 
legal institutions; and 3) international commerce requires legal certainty429 so 
that contracts clear quickly and efficiently such that economic actors press for 
predictable legal institutions (procedural justice). Wealth creation also makes 
the real protection of human rights much likelier in practice by increasing life 
expectancy and quality of life, thereby reducing violent crime. 
Lawlessness and poverty also make Russian governance no model for 
emulation in the developing world, thus hindering Russian foreign policy. Who 
wants to follow the Russian development model of institutionalized corruption 
and dependence on resource exports? 
 
prisons, armed forces and international friendship) and there are things that must be kept in 
silence . . . .”). 
 425. MENDRAS, supra note 277, at 284 (“The subordination of the judges and the rulers’ 
irresponsibility are major obstacles to the respect for basic rights . . . .”). 
 426. Ellyatt, supra note 321 (“As a result of cases like this and others, foreign direct 
investment in Russia remained low compared to other major Emerging Market economies.”) 
 427. Id. (“Corruption is a big problem in Russia but it is not the biggest problem—the biggest 
problem is that investors don’t trust Russia in the long-term.”). In fact these are related problems: 
corruption leads to distrust which results in less foreign investment. Id. 
 428. See, e.g., Craig Forcese, Human Rights Mean Business: Broadening the Canadian 
Approach to Business and Human Rights, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 71, 74 (Isfahan Merali & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001). 
 429. Deckstein et al., supra note 166 (“What German companies expect more than anything is 
legal certainty and economic reforms. For them, the Russian market, which, unlike many others, 
continues to grow, is both promising and potentially treacherous. Indeed, whether a business 
venture succeeds or fails in Russia is still largely determined by politics.”). 
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3. International Law and Foreign Policy: Geopolitics and “Clash of 
Civilizations” 
Russian foreign policy generally expresses itself as in conflict in a “clash 
of civilizations”430 between Great Russian Orthodox corporatism on the one 
hand and the non-Slavic world on the other. The logic of ideological conflict 
not only shores up domestic support for Russia United, but it also gives 
Russian foreign policy a flexible431 inner logic with which to frame 
international differences in terms that Putin believes will favor Russian 
interests. However, pan-Slavic or Great Russian corporatist orthodoxy cannot 
present universal appeal and thus cannot present a global challenge to Western 
liberal democracy, whereas Western liberal democracy presents itself as a 
universally applicable model. 
Russia’s conflicts range across the spectrum from trade policy, to 
terrorism, to inter-state conflicts, which we now examine. 
a. Trade Policy 
Economic interactions are usually positive sum. Nonetheless, judging by 
its actions, Russia sees trade policy in zero-sum terms. Though Russia has 
joined the WTO, Russia takes one-sided interpretations to trade disputes and 
uses non-tariff barriers as protectionist measures. For example, Russia’s claim 
that women’s underwear without a certain percentage of cotton is unhealthy 
 
 430. Alexander Rahr, Pussy Riot Ushers in a New Clash of Civilizations, RUSS. BEYOND 
HEADLINES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://rbth.com/articles/2012/08/10/pussy_riot_ushers_in_a_new_ 
clash_of_civilizations_17221.html. 
 431. Pomerantsev explains it in this way: 
[F]ar from being in transition towards democratic capitalism, 21st century Russian rulers 
have learnt to use the techniques of democracy for distinctly undemocratic ends. Russia 
has elections, but they are arranged so as to strengthen the Kremlin, rather than strengthen 
checks and balances. Russia has a civil society, but it is hard to know which non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are actually created by, and support the state, while 
genuinely independent bodies struggle to survive under evolving restrictions and 
harassment. Outside the federal TV channels, critical media does exist in Russia, but they 
are framed by the centre, so as to ultimately undermine any real opposition. Russia also 
has private companies, but they are controlled in a quasi-patrimonial manner. 
  . . . 21st century Russia takes a much more ‘postmodern’ approach to control. 
Postmodern in the sense that it uses many of the techniques associated with postmodern 
art and philosophy: pastiches of other’s narratives, simulacra (i.e. fake) institutions, and a 
‘society of spectacle’ with no substance. The regime’s salient feature is a liquid, shape-
shifting approach to power. Freed from the cumbersome body of ‘hard’ totalitarianism, 
the leaders of today’s Kremlin can speak like liberal modernisers in the morning and 
religious fanatics in the afternoon. 
Peter Pomerantsev, Russia: A Postmodern Dictatorship?, LEGATUM INST., Oct. 2013, at 1, 3, 
available at http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/2013-publications-
russia-a-postmodern-dictatorship-.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
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and thus barred from import into Russia432 is obvious nonsense, a clear 
violation of Russia’s WTO obligations.433 Non-tariff barriers and technical 
barriers to trade are, and will be, used by Russia to delay suppression of 
Russia’s illegal trade restrictions. In this case, the six percent cotton 
requirement is most likely intended to foster Kazakh cotton sales. Similarly, 
genetically modified organisms are another example of a trade conflict434 
where we can expect Russian intransigence and non-compliance with rules that 
Russia supposedly agreed to—all the while complaining loudly about supposed 
Western double standards.435 One can likewise expect continued 
obstructionism by Russia at the European Court of Human Rights when it rules 
against the Russian government. One-sided legal interpretations are the 
consequence of the command theory of law, which does not see the law as an 
objective measure serving the interest of justice. 
b. Rearmament and Arms Sales 
The risk of a new cold war is also evident in Russia’s military policies. 
Russia is rearming and consolidating power through corporatism in its military 
services.436 Putin is transforming the Russian military from a badly paid and 
abused conscript army into a smaller well paid and better armed force with 
motivated volunteers directed to elite units. Consistent with Great Russian 
Orthodoxy, Putin both permits the Russian army to recruit Russian-speaking 
foreigners437 and uses cossacks438 as police or quasi-police. Russia is asserting 
military power through the reintroduction of long-range (presumably nuclear-
armed) bomber patrols,439 the stationing of Iskandar cruise missiles in 
 
 432. Panty Riot: Eurasian Women Draw a Visible Line Against Lingerie Law, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014, 8:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/19/panty-riot-
eurasian-women-draw-a-visible-line-against-lingerie-law. 
 433. See, e.g., Duma Seeks Moratorium on GMO Production in Russia, RT NEWS (Feb. 26, 
2014, 9:42 AM), http://rt.com/politics/russian-duma-gmo-moratorium-804 (noting that since 
Russia joined the WTO, trade restrictions can only be imposed based on certain conditions). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Russia Blasts PACE’s ‘Double Standard’ Resolution on Ukraine, RT NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2014, 4:03 PM), http://rt.com/news/russia-pace-ukraine-resolution-423/. 
 436. Russian Military Pay Rises, But Draft to Remain—Chief, RIA NOVOSTI (Oct. 7, 2012, 
7:10 PM), http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121007/176467212.html. 
 437. Russia’s Military To Recruit More Foreigners, RTT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:57 AM), 
http://www.rttnews.com/1782797/russia-s-military-to-recruit-more-foreigners.aspx. 
 438. Jolie Lee, Who Are Russia’s Cossack Militiamen in Pussy Riot Beating?, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 20, 2014, 3:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/02/20/cossack-
militiamen-pussy-riot-sochi/5636603/. 
 439. Russia Restores Bomber Patrols, CNN (Aug. 17, 2007, 12:48 PM), http://edition.cnn. 
com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/17/russia.airforce.reut/index.html; see also Russian Bombers to 
Continue Patrols Over South America, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:44 AM), http://en.ria.ru/ 
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Kaliningrad Oblast,440 and testing RS-26 “Rubezh” missiles in violation of the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty.441 Russia is also acquiring more and 
updated nuclear missile submarines,442 TOPOL rockets with multiple 
independent reentry vehicles (MIRV),443 and the Mistral helicopter carrier 
from France,444 a historical Russian ally, as well as developing its T-50 fighter 
aircraft. Given these facts Russia—or the U.S.—may withdraw from the 
START treaty.445 Russia is also using arms sales to support its foreign policy, 
most evidently in its sale of an aircraft carrier to India.446 Russia is also seeking 
base options overseas, notably in countries where the USSR had military 
bases.447 These arms policies are intended to support Russian use of force in 
places like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Republic of Crimea, Donetsk National 
Republic, and elsewhere. 
c. Terrorism 
Russia and the U.S. claim a desire to cooperate in the fight against 
terrorism and narcotics.448 However, I have little hope for actual cooperation 
 
military_news/20131101/184462190/Russian-Bombers-to-Continue-Patrols-Over-South-Ameri 
ca.html. 
 440. Eastern Europe: Russian Missiles in Kaliningrad Annoy Poland and Lithuania, SPIEGEL 
(Dec. 16, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/russische-iskander-raketen-in-
kaliningrad-veraergern-polen-und-litauen-a-939430.html. 
 441. Warren Mass, U.S. Says Russia Violated INF Treaty with Test, NEW AMERICAN (Jan. 31, 
2014, 3:29 PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/17525-u-s-says-
russia-violated-inf-treaty-with-test. 
 442. Vladimir Isachenkov, New Russian Nuclear Submarine Enters Service, YAHOO NEWS 
(Jan. 10, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/russian-nuclear-submarine-enters-1603317 
89.html. 
 443. Russia’s Missile Forces to Replace Topol-M with Multiple-Warhead RS-24, RIA 
NOVOSTI (Nov. 30, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20101130/161558446.html. 
 444. First Russian Mistral-Class Helicopter Carrier Launched in French Town of Saint-
Nazaire, VOICE OF RUSS. (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_ 
10_15/First-Russian-Mistral-class-helicopter-carrier-launched-in-French-town-of-Saint-Nazaire-
4770/. 
 445. Russia Threatens to Quit START as US Deploys Aegis Destroyer to Spain, RT NEWS 
(Feb. 4, 2014, 9:22 AM), http://rt.com/news/destroyer-us-poland-start-treaty-530/. 
 446. India’s New Flagship: Russia Hands Over Modernized Aircraft Carrier to New Delhi, 
RT NEWS (Nov. 16, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://rt.com/news/russia-india-aircraft-carrier-834/. 
 447. Russia Seeks Several Military Bases Abroad—Defense Minister, RIA NOVOSTI (Feb. 26, 
2014, 7:56 PM), http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140226/187917901/Russia-Seeks-Several-Mili 
tary-Bases-Abroad—Defense-Minister.html. 
 448. Cooperation with US, EU on Fighting Drugs Continues Regardless of Sanctions—FSKN 
Head, VOICE OF RUSS. (May 14, 2014, 1:07 PM), http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_14/Co 
operation-with-US-EU-on-fighting-drugs-continues-regardless-of-sanctions-FSKN-head-5402/. 
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given the cyber attacks Russia launched against Estonia,449 the bombings at 
Domodedovo450 and Boston,451 as well as the conflicts in Syria and Crimea. I 
expect Russia and the U.S. to act as if they are fully cooperating in their 
struggle against terrorist violence, while simultaneously questioning if they 
should even bother or simply go back to state-sponsored terrorism, whether 
indirectly through Iran452 and Saudi Arabia453 or directly. Of course, military 
professionals, who actually have a life to lose in such struggles—unlike the 
diplomats and politicians—find such considerations horrific. 
d. The Use of Force Under International Law 
The general principles of the sovereign equality of States,454 of non-
interference in other States’ domestic affairs,455 of non-intervention,456 and of 
national self-determination,457 along with the general prohibition of the use of 
force in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, mean that military intervention is 
presumptively illegal unless authorized by the Security Council under Article 
42 of the U.N. Charter or in self-defense.458 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
 
 449. Adam O’Donnell, Russia Kinda-Sorta Owns up to Estonia Cyberwar, ZDNET (Mar. 8, 
2009, 3:43 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/russia-kinda-sorta-owns-up-to-estonia-
cyberwar/2828. 
 450. N.B., The Domodedovo Airport Bombing: Did the Moscow Bomber Skip Security?, THE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2011, 4:56 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/01/domo 
dedovo_airport_bombing. 
 451. Eileen Sullivan & Matt Apuzzo, Russia Wiretapped Boston Bombing Suspect, Recorded 
Conversation with Mother: Officials, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2013, 5:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/27/russia-wiretap-bombing-suspect_n_3171102.html. 
 452. Greg Bruno, State Sponsors: Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362 (“The U.S. State Department considers Iran the 
world’s ‘most active state sponsor of terrorism.’”). 
 453. Declan Walsh, WikiLeaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for 
Terrorists, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/ 
dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding; see also Ted Galen Carpenter, Terrorist 
Sponsors: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, CATO INST. (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cato.org/publi 
cations/commentary/terrorist-sponsors-saudi-arabia-pakistan-china. 
 454. Even in the Soviet era, this was the case. See GRUNDRISS VÖLKERRECHT 53 (Edith 
Poeser & Walter Poeggel eds., 1983) (unverified source). 
 455. Id. at 59; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 19 (June 27). 
 456. HEINEGG, supra note 113, §§ 470–71. For a brief overview on these concepts, see 
MANFRED KÜNG & MARTIN ECKERT, REPETITORIUM ZUM VÖLKERRECHT § 424 (1993) 
(unverified source). 
 457. James Mayall, Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the ‘New World Order,’ 67 
INT’L AFF. 421, 424 (1991). 
 458. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: 
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 321, 373 (1998); Any U.S. Attack on Syria Will Need U.N. Approval, MIDDLE EAST IN 
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outlaws the use of force without Security Council approval.459 When can a 
state use force for humanitarian purposes?460 Prior to the U.N. Charter, 
humanitarian intervention, like the use of force generally, was legally 
permitted to any state.461 Since the implementation of the Charter, however, it 
remains uncertain whether and when intervention may be justified by human 
rights violations.462 What is certain: if approved by the Security Council, 
humanitarian intervention is legal. However, unauthorized armed intervention 
is presumptively illegal. Might an unauthorized humanitarian intervention be 
justified? Under the Charter logic, only as an act of defense of the state or its 
citizens or nationals.463 Even if legal, the use of force in humanitarian 
intervention is subject to the general rule that force must be necessary to 
prevent some greater harm and must be likely to be effective thereto.464 That is, 
the use of force under international law must be strictly necessary (no 
alternative) and proportional (limited) to the threat it is intended to neutralize. 
To clarify the ambiguity regarding the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, I distinguish humanitarian relief from humanitarian rescue and 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
DEPTH (Aug. 27, 2013), http://themideastindepth.com/2013/08/27/any-u-s-attack-on-syria-will-
be-illegal-under-international-law/. 
 459. Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 458. Although, with Security Council approval, an 
intervention to secure democratic rights may well be legal intervention in the internal affairs of 
another state. See id. at 373, 378 (explaining lawful, pro-democratic humanitarian intervention). 
 460. For an early effort in the U.N. era to grapple with the idea of whether and when 
humanitarian intervention might be lawful, see Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary 
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. 
Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203, 256–57 (1974) (noting that where intense human rights 
violations exist, humanitarian intervention might be lawful). 
 461. Cf. Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 458, at 372–73. In discussing the uncertain 
legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, Nowrot and Schabacker noted: 
Even if the international community of states once accepted a customary doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, it is not at all clear that the doctrine survived the United 
Nations Charter. Given the recent United Nations authorized humanitarian interventions 
in Somalia, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, however, it is possible to conclude that 
humanitarian intervention may be legally authorized by the Security Council. The legal 
status of unauthorized interventions, however, is tenuous. 
Id. at 372. 
 462. U.N. Charter arts. 32, 42; HEINEGG, supra note 113, §§ 451, 454. See also Ian Hurd, Is 
Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 293, 299, 311 (2011) (“Contemporary international law can be read as either allowing or 
forbidding international humanitarian intervention, and the legal uncertainty around humanitarian 
intervention is fundamental and irresolvable. Contradictory and plausible interpretations about the 
legality of any act of intervention exist simultaneously, and neither can be eliminated.”). I agree 
that ambiguity exists, but I regard the ambiguity as resolvable through structured coherent logic. 
 463. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 464. HEINEGG, supra note 113, § 455. 
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1) Provision of humanitarian relief aid465 (devoir d'ingèrence)466 does not 
involve the use of armed force and thus does not require U.N. Security Council 
authorization. Therefore, the current U.S. humanitarian relief in Syria is legal 
under international law. 
2) Humanitarian rescue of hostages, an actual state practice,467 whether 
by Russia in Tartus, Israel at Entebbe, or France at Kolwezei, is lawful under 
international law as a form of self-defense of the state’s own citizens or 
nationals. 
3) Humanitarian intervention (droit d’ingèrgence) is the use of armed 
force to protect people468 and is distinct from humanitarian relief aid.469 
Humanitarian intervention may seek merely to separate warring parties (peace-
keeping) or may go further and seek to protect people, or to remove a person, 
persons, or even a government (peace-making).470 
While some authors argue for an international duty to respect and protect 
human rights,471 which would entail a general right to humanitarian 
intervention,472 the U.N. Charter makes the rules on jus ad bello clear. The 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine, to present, is only de lege ferenda. 
“Responsibility to protect” is merely a hortatory political claim, not a legal 
right.473 
 
 465. See 10 U.S.C. § 2561(a) (2000) (stating Department of Defense humanitarian assistance 
funds should be used for transporting humanitarian relief or for other humanitarian purposes). 
 466. Devoir et Droit d’Ingèrence, RÉSEAU DE RECHERCHE SUR LES OPÉRATIONS DE PAIX, 
http://www.operationspaix.net/41-lexique-devoir-et-droit-d-ingerence.html (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014) (“Le droit d’ingérence est la reconnaissance du droit des États de violer la souveraineté 
nationale d’un autre État, en cas de violation massive des droits de la personne. Le devoir 
d’ingérence, quant à lui, est conçu comme plus contraignant. Il désigne l’obligation morale faite à 
un État de fournir son assistance en cas d’urgence humanitaire. Ni le droit, ni le devoir 
d’ingérence n’ont d’existence dans le droit humanitaire international. L’ingérence elle-même 
n’est pas un concept juridique défini. Au sens commun, il signifie intervenir, sans y être invité, 
dans des affaires qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d’un État.”) 
 467. Actual state practice is one element of customary international law. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108–09 (June 
27) (noting that to form a new customary rule, there must be actual state action). 
 468. HEINEGG, supra note 113, § 451. 
 469. See Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: 
The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 329, 340 (1995) (distinguishing humanitarian assistance from humanitarian 
intervention). 
 470. HEINEGG, supra note 113, §§ 456–57. 
 471. For an argument that sovereignty consists of the responsibility to protect, see id. § 384. I 
regard that as desirable but wishful thinking—de lege ferenda, if that. 
 472. See Anne-Cécile Robert, Origines et Vicissitudes du “Droit d’Ingèrence,” MONDE 
DIPLOMATIQUE (May 2011), http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2011/05/ROBERT/20488. 
 473. But a political right may nevertheless at times be effective. See Louis Henkin, NATO’s 
Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
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Russia’s argument that its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine were 
somehow legal is thus unfounded since the U.N. Security Council did not 
authorize the Russian interventions. Without the approval of the U.N. Security 
Council,474 humanitarian intervention, however desirable it may be to some,475 
is presumptively illegal476 for otherwise there would be abuse of such right.477 
For example, if the Russian logic in Crimea were the rule, China might choose 
to annex parts of Siberia to protect the undocumented Chinese living there, or 
any of the various Chinatown exclaves around the world. Likewise, France 
could intervene in Québec to secure Québec’s liberation. The rules Russia 
purports to uphold are untenable because they would destabilize the entire 
world and are unacceptable because every state on earth has an interest in its 
own territorial integrity. Thus, Russia is and will increasingly remain isolated, 
particularly since China must be concerned about secessionist movements in 
Tibet, Taiwan, or even Hong Kong, as well as insular claims of China’s 
neighbors to islands that it regards as Chinese territory.478 We now look briefly 
at the interventions in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine to see the contours of the 
cold peace. 
 
824, 825–26 (1999) (“[It is] the responsibility of the world community to address threats to 
international peace and security resulting from genocide and other crimes against humanity.”). 
 474. Russia’s position, likewise, seems to be that the Security Council approval of 
humanitarian intervention is required if such a right exists at all. See L.N. Tarasova, K Diskoossii 
o Pravomyernosti Goomanitarnoy Intyervyentzii [To the Discussion on the Legality of 
Humanitarian Intervention] 9 VOPROSE TZIVILISTICHYESKOY NAOOKI I SOVRYEMYENNOSTJ 
[QUESTIONS OF SCIENCE AND MODERNITY] 99, 100 (2011) (noting that the legal status of 
humanitarian intervention under international law is ambiguous, but probably does not exist 
without U.N. Security Council approval). 
 475. Often, U.S. authors argue, perhaps understandably and certainly from good intentions, 
for a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention to prevent gross violations of basic human 
rights. I think those arguments are wrong as a matter of positive law and do not recognize the fact 
that enabling unilateral humanitarian intervention for one state enables it for all states. See Amy 
Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and International Humanitarian Interventions, 7 INT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 49, 49–50 (2001) (arguing that international law permits unilateral intervention 
to prevent gross violations of human rights). 
 476. Henkin, supra note 473, at 824. 
 477. The reason that unilateral intervention is illegal is because of the fact that otherwise 
spurious claims to “humanitarian” intervention would be made any time any state wished to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other weaker states. The Russian literature is reserved regarding 
the right to humanitarian intervention, and critical of its potential for abuse. As early as 1910, 
scholars noted the human rights atrocities committed in the name of humanitarian intervention 
and the problem of pretextual abuse of the idea of the right to humanitarian intervention. See 
generally Antoine Rougier, La Théorie de l’Intervention d’Humanité, 17 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 468 (1910). 
 478. J.M. Norton, Why Chinese Study the Warring States Period, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 12, 
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-chinese-study-the-warring-states-period/?allpages= 
yes?allpages=yes&print=yes. 
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i. Georgia 
Russia always asserts that all its actions are consistent with international 
law, even when that obviously is not the case. In Georgia, for example, Russia 
claims that its military intervention and creation of the barely recognized 
puppet states of “Abkhazia”479 and “South Ossetia”480 were perfectly legal 
under international law481 despite the clear prohibition of the use of force under 
the U.N. Charter. In the 2008 Georgia war, the U.N. Security Council did not 
authorize the use of force. Moreover, there was no issue of self-defense of 
Russian territory, and while Russia could argue its defense of Russian 
peacekeepers was legal self-defense,482 the formation of the puppet states of 
“Abkhazia” and “South Ossetia” was clearly a violation of international law as 
an injury to the territorial integrity of Georgia. 
ii. Syria 
In Syria, an ally483 of Russia,484 President Assad violated the international 
right to life485 by perpetrating mass killings486 of unarmed persons, a crime 
 
 479. Abkhazia, populated by Russian nationals, is recognized de jure only by the Russian 
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru, as well as by Transnistria and South Ossetia, 
neither of which are recognized states as their absence at the UN makes clear. See Abkhazia 
Profile, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
18175030 (noting that Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and a number of small Pacific Island states 
would formally recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia). 
 480. South Ossetia Profile, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-europe-18269210 (“Internationally, only Russian’s Latin-American allies Venezuela and 
Nicaragua have recognised South Ossetian independence, apart from a few Pacific island 
states.”). 
 481. Nicolai N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1524, 1531 (2009); Press Release, Ambassade de la Fédération de Russie au Royaume 
de Belgique, The Guns of August: The Russian View on the Origins of the 2008 War in the 
Caucuses and on the Way Forward for the Region (Aug. 2009) (available at http://www.belgium. 
mid.ru/press/247_en.html). 
 482. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE 
CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 23 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf. 
 483. Their alliance is exemplified by an agreement between the USSR and Syria on Soviet 
use of naval facilities at Latakia and Tartus in exchange for delivery of adopted air defence 
missiles and jet fighter planes. See GEORGE GINSBURGS & ROBERT M. SLUSSER, A CALENDAR 
OF SOVIET TREATIES 1958–1973, at 674 (1981). 
 484. The Russian led Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) had been considering 
entering into a free trade agreement with Syria. Tamoʐyenniy soyoz i Siriya mogoot podpisatʲ 
dogovor o sozdanii zoni svobodniy torgovli  [Customs Union and Syria Could Sign a Treaty on 
the Establishment of Free Trade], 100 TELEVISION RUSSIA (May 28, 2012, 8:05 AM), 
http://www.tv100.ru/news/tamojennyy-soyuz-i-siriya-mogut-podpisat-dogovor-o-sozdanii-zony-
svobodnyy-torgovli-56782/. However, that is probably no longer the case. Moreover, although 
Russia had been regularly selling arms to Syria, Russia has likely stopped this practice. See 
Valerie Cheron, La Russie vend 36 Yak-130 à la Syrie, RP DEFENSE (Jan. 27, 2012), http://rpde 
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against humanity.487 War crimes,488 crimes against humanity, and torture489 are 
non-derogable international customary laws490—ius cogens.491 Violators of ius 
cogens are subject to universal jurisdiction.492 Unfortunately, none of that 
legalizes the use of force by any state as a remedy to these grave human rights 
violations because of the principles of sovereign equality and its corollaries, 
the prohibition of intervention in purely domestic affairs of other states and the 
general prohibition of the use of force under international law. However, 
although humanitarian intervention in Syria or Georgia would be illegal, the 
U.S. humanitarian relief in Syria, to present, is legal. 
Russia takes inconsistent positions on armed intervention in Georgia 
versus Syria. Although Russia somehow regards its interventions in Georgia 
and Crimea as legal under international law, Russia simultaneously asserts that 
 
fense.over-blog.com/article-la-russie-vend-36-yak-130-a-la-syrie-98070122.html; La Russie Ne 
Conclura Pas De Nouveaux Contrats De Vente D’armes Avec La Syrie, AMNESTY INT’L SUISSE 
(July 9, 2012), http://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/moyen-orient-afrique-du-nord/syrie/docs/2012/ 
russie-stop-armes-syrie. Putin states his strategy is to force both sides to the negotiating table. 
Russland liefert Syrien keine Waffen mehr, 20 MINUTEN (July 9, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.20 
min.ch/ausland/news/story/26129790. 
 485. Syrian Activists Say Dozens Killed in Hama Province, CBC NEWS (June 6, 2012, 6:36 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/06/06/syria-hama-violence.html (“The reported 
mass killings are likely to ignite more anger nearly two weeks after the massacre of more than 
100 people elsewhere in Syria as an international peace plan unravels and the country spirals 
toward civil war.”). 
 486. Sévane Garibian, Crime Against Humanity, ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA MASS VIOLENCE 
(June 19, 2008), http://www.massviolence.org/Crime-against-Humanity. 
 487. Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 178, 179–80 (1946) 
(stating that most crimes against humanity are also war crimes and vice versa); Richard Vernon, 
What is Crime Against Humanity?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 231, 233, 248 (2002). 
 488. War crimes today probably include rape, certainly because it is a systematic practice 
intended to degrade, subjugate, and destroy an entire people. Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 425, 428 (1993). 
 489. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession Dec. 10, 1984, 465 U.N.T.S. 113. 
 490. For an overview of ius cogens, see Tahmina Karimova, Derogation from Human Rights 
Treaties in Situations of Emergency, RULAC, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/print. 
php?page=12 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (defining torture as a non-deragable right common to all 
treaties). 
 491. MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, VÖLKERRECHT §§ 14, 16 (7th ed. 2008) (unverified source). 
 492. For a theoretical overview, see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 
YALE J. INT’L L. 85 (2004). 
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any Western intervention in Syria would be a violation of the general 
international law principle of non-intervention.493 
Given the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, it is entirely possible 
that the conflict in Syria will devolve into an illegal proxy war. So far, Syria 
has only proven to be a very indirect proxy war, with Saudi Arabia financing 
rebels and Iran backing Assad.494 To present, it seems both Russia and the 
United States are trying to restrain their rogue suzerains, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
respectively. The illegal annexation of Crimea, however, may have already 
broken that restraint. The U.S. has expelled the Syrian Embassy from 
Washington after the Crimean annexation.495 Perhaps unsurprisingly to some, 
Israel launched the heaviest air raids on Syria in years,496 while Turkey shot 
down a Syrian jet fighter.497 Although inter arma silent leges, international 
legal rights and duties are still relevant to the Syrian conflict, at least for now, 
because the U.S. and Russia are not yet overtly committed to proxy war in 
Syria—or elsewhere for that matter. This is one of the reasons I refer to the 
currently frozen relations with Russia as “cold peace” rather than “cold war.” 
iii. Ukraine 
Ukraine is the most recent major conflict point between Russia and the 
West. In Ukraine, it was entirely evident that Russia was willing to tolerate the 
formation of an authoritarian dictatorship, another Belarus, as a part of its 
formation of a Great Russian imperium: failing to attain that, Russia annexed 
Crimea to guarantee control of its naval base, using the protection of Russian 
nationals in Crimea from non-existent discrimination and disorder as a pretext 
for its illegal annexation. Russia’s annexation of Crimea was simply illegal as 
 
 493. Alexei Anishchuk, Russia Warns Against Military Intervention in Syria, REUTERS (Aug. 
26, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-syria-crisis-lavrov-interven 
tion-idUSBRE97P0G220130826. 
 494. Doyle McManus, Syria and the Perils of Proxy War, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/12/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-proxy-war-syria-201401 
12. 
 495. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel Support U.S. Expulsion of Syrian Diplomats, 
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press 
-release/chairman-royce-ranking-member-engel-support-us-expulsion-syrian-diplomats; Syrian 
Embassy in Washington Closed, Diplomats Expelled, WASH. FREE BEACON (Mar. 19, 2014, 9:16 
AM), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/syrian-embassy-in-washington-closed-diplomats-ex 
pelled/. 
 496. Lebanese Media: IsraeliAir Raid Hits Hezbollah ‘Missile Site,’ Kills Militants, 
JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 25, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Lebanese-media-
Israeli-air-raid-hits-Hezbollah-targets-342439. 
 497. Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Downs Warplane from Syria After Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2014, at A5. 
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a matter of international law:498 Russia’s annexation was a violation of its 
treaty obligation under its Treaty of Friendship to respect Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity499 and under the universally recognized general principle of the 
territorial integrity of each State under customary international law.500 Russia’s 
argument that the annexation was somehow an exercise of national self-
determination is nonsense since there is no Crimean nation. Russian nationals 
living in Crimea who wished to live in Russia were in fact free to move to 
Russia, and were not facing discrimination or human rights abuses, contrary to 
the claims of the Russian federation.501 
Russia’s comparison of its illegal annexation of Crimea to Kosovo’s 
separation from Serbia is also wrong. Kosovo was not annexed by any state 
and faced actual grave human rights violations, and it was also the subject of a 
U.N. Resolution.502 The so called “republic of Crimea” existed for only one 
day, was recognized by only one state, and was immediately annexed by that 
state.503 Russia’s illegal annexation is a violation of international law and of 
Ukrainian national law.504 Consequently, an isolation of Russia through 
economic sanctions has already started.505 Hopefully this process will not end 
in proxy wars and state-sponsored terrorism—characteristics of the Cold War. 
 
 498. This illegality was reflected by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution condemning the 
annexation. Louis Charbonneau & Mirjam Donath, U.N. General Assembly Declares Crimea 
Secession Vote Invalid, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
03/27/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBREA2Q1GA20140327. 
 499. Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Partnership, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174. 
 500. U.N. Charter art. 2. 
 501. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both make clear that the human rights 
abuses in Crimea are against journalists and Ukrainians, not against the Russian language 
“minority” in Crimea. Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces Rein in Units 
Operating Outside Law, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/ 
03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearances-illegal-forces; Made in Russia: Crimea’s Grim Human 
Rights Predicament, AMNESTY GLOBAL HUMAN RTS. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2014), http://livewire.am 
nesty.org/2014/03/22/made-in-russia-crimeas-grim-human-rights-predicament/. 
 502. Iñigo Urrutia Libarona, Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination: The Approach of 
the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, REVISTA D’ESTUDIS 
AUTONÒMICS I FEDERALS, Oct. 2012, at 107, 107–08. 
 503. Matt Smith & Alla Eshchenko, Ukraine Cries ‘Robbery’ As Russia Annexes Crimea,  
CNN (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/; 
Matt Smith & Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Ukraine ‘Will Never Accept’ Crimea Annexation, 
President Says, CNN (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/ 
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Inconsistent Russian positions on intervention in Syria versus Georgia and 
Ukraine and one-sided interpretations of Russia’s treaty obligations toward 
Ukraine506 and its obligations under the WTO are examples of the double 
standards of which Russia so often complains.507 This exemplifies the sort of 
one-sided intransigence, if not hypocrisy, that the Kremlin believes best 
advances its interests. Given the absence of the idea of the rule of law in 
Russian political consciousness, this duplicity is at least comprehensible. 
However, lawlessness hinders economic growth in Russia and limits Russia’s 
ability to lead its putative allies, ultimately leading to the international isolation 
of Russia. No honest or intelligent person would view Russia as a fantastic 
opportunity for investment or view its ideas about law and international 
relations as attractive or compelling; and, as currently configured, Russia's 
ideology will not attract global supporters. Putin’s power base is solid, but 
expanding it will prove difficult, if not impossible. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Putin clearly casts Russia within a clash of civilizations, we can 
rightly ask ourselves: What exactly is this clash about? 
Economically, Russia and the West are in conflict over trade ties and 
resources, a conflict that expresses itself through different visions of the role of 
individual rights, the rule of law, and democracy in the theory of law and the 
state. 
Ideologically, the conflict between Russia and the West is between Great 
Russian corporatist orthodoxy with a weak rule of law and “vertical hierarchy” 
and the Western triumvirate of “the rule of law,” “human rights,” and 
“democracy.” While Europe tries to foster the rule of law, democracy,508 and 
the protection of human rights,509 Russia is at best ambivalent, at worst cynical, 
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discussed at all levels. In 2005 regular, six-monthly EU-Russia human rights consultations were 
established. They have provided for a substantial dialogue on human rights issues in Russia and 
the EU and on EU-Russian cooperation on human rights issues in international fora. The EU also 
maintains a regular dialogue with both Russian and international NGOs on human rights issues. 
Issues that the EU raises with Russia in the human rights consultations include: the human rights 
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and/or hypocritical about human rights and the rule of law. Russia 
misperceives itself as trapped in a zero-sum conflict of civilizations, leading to 
a situation that can best be characterized as a cold peace. However, differences 
over domestic governance questions such as corruption or gay rights are not 
differences that states would realistically go to war over—unlike border issues. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the constant conflicts between Russia and the West 
will degrade into the endemic worldwide proxy wars and state-sponsored 
terrorism that characterized the Cold War. The conflict between Russia and the 
West, though increasingly zero-sum, is a relative conflict within Greco-Roman 
thought, not an absolute conflict between radically opposite economic systems. 
Unlike the Cold War, these conflicts are not expressions of antithetical 
ideologies, and so they will likely remain for the most part political. There may 
be occasional and exceptional proxy wars or even indirect state-sponsored 
terrorism through proxies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the 
occurrence of such negative-sum manifestations of these conflicts is uncertain, 
undesirable, and avoidable. Since these conflicts are relative and marginal, not 
absolute or total, this ideological clash will not result in a new (global) cold 
war, but likely will reflect a regional cold peace; or, perhaps, a regional cold 
war. The West is more likely to win these conflicts, not only due to greater 
material resources, but also due to a more efficient governance system that 
better attains desired goals. 
Although Putin has elaborated a viable ideology and governance structure 
for maintaining personal rule within Russia, that structure cannot, as currently 
cast, outlive him, nor can it attract significant foreign investment, nor does it 
have global appeal. Thus, until Russia transforms itself into a rule of law state, 
we can expect continued suboptimal economic performance, lack of 
industrialization, and further eclipse of Russia by China—to say nothing of the 
inevitable chaos and instability Putin’s death would cause. 
  
 
situation in Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus, including torture and ill-treatment; 
freedom of expression and assembly, including freedom of the media; the situation of civil 
society in Russia, notably in light of the laws on NGOs and extremist activities; the functioning 
of the judiciary, including independence issues; the observation of human rights standards by law 
enforcement officials; racism and xenophobia; legislation relating to elections. For its part the 
Russian side raises matters of concern to it in developments inside the EU.”). 
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